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This paper advances and draws on the following four propositions.  First, in analysing the 
role of universities in social transformation there is a need to draw a distinction between the 
pre- and post-Apartheid periods; the former focuses on practices of resistance to the 
Apartheid regime and the latter on constituting a democratic polity in part by addressing 
Apartheid legacies. The second draws attention to the unintended consequences of National 
Party policy. It established black universities to produce passive elites to administer ethnic 
political institutions but created instead terrains that established a vibrant oppositional 
student movement and other forms of resistance within and related to the higher education 
sector. Third, in the post 1994 period the position of the state towards the role of 
universities and social transformation is derived from a policy inevitably open to reading in 
two opposing ways. The state demands that universities contribute towards economic and 
socio-political transformation, yet the nature of the transition from Apartheid to a 
democratic regime, its macro-economic state policies, and the constraints of globalisation 
have led to two opposing tendencies. In the first, universities are expected to perform as 
viable “corporate enterprises” producing graduates to help steer South Africa into a 
competitive global economy. In the second, universities are expected to serve the public 
good and produce critical citizens for a vibrant democratic society. To be sure these two 
tendencies need not be inherently contradictory, yet they do contain in a country with deep 
class, race and gender divisions the possibility of pulling in opposite directions.  Last, when 
we consider universities as intrinsic sites of civil society, then the focus on the relationship 
between the state and civil society can be used to better illuminate some of the problems 
associated with the role of universities in the post-Apartheid system.  While the ANC 
controlled state actively pursues a transformative agenda, institutions of civil society 
continue to be sites of ongoing contestation and remain more reticent to change. 
Universities, like other civil society institutions, if they are not simplistically conceived as 
monolithic coherent blocs, but as constituted by different constituencies (faculty, 
departments, students, administrators, workers, etc.) allows us to see how various sectors 
could function in contradictory ways - reproducing, eroding, transforming or remaining 
consciously oblivious to inherited and prevailing social relations.  
 
The report in summary is organised into three broad sections:  The first part includes a 
descriptive analysis of the main features of higher education under white domination, 
particularly those features of the historically black universities (HBUs) that created the 
material conditions for the heightened role of student resistance. Particular focus is on 
student mobilised protest campaigns that helped produce the crisis of Apartheid rule after 
the mid 1970’s. The second part locates post-Apartheid developments in higher education 
in relation to the nature of the transition and the macro-economic context adopted post-
1994. The third section analyses the relations between State policies, university responses to 
higher education reform, and their empirical impact on the economic, political, social, and 







1.1.  Higher Education and Social Transformation 
 
The role of higher education institutions in social change during Apartheid is more obvious 
and clearly visible than its role in the ongoing transformation of contemporary South 
African society. However the intensely differentiated nature of higher education both in the 
past and present makes it difficult to speak about it as a “system” having coherence and an 
undifferentiated identity; hence it is problematic to conceive of a positive empirical 
relationship between higher education and social transformation in South Africa. The role 
of higher education institutions in contributing to the collapse of the Apartheid social order 
cannot be answered in an abstract, generalizable or purely causal manner. For example, 
while many black students, a few progressive academics in some departments, and 
unionised workers actively participated in the internal resistance movement to bring about 
the collapse of Apartheid, universities as institutions did not themselves serve as major 
levers of power against the old order. Instead, these institutions provided the institutional 
terrain, displaying repressive as well as conducive conditions (“protective spaces”) that 
facilitated student protest behaviour. Only when higher education institutions are 
disaggregated into their various constituents does the role of each sector with respect to 
social transformation become more apparent.  
 
During the Apartheid period, black students at historically black institutions created by the 
regime to produce and domesticate emerging black elites made higher education an 
important terrain of student mobilisation, ideological debate, and resistance. At the same 
time we should not to ignore other elements of protest within higher education: the 
resistance, less profound, but nevertheless present of black students at historically white 
universities, the activism of progressive white students and academics, the odd registering of 
protest of government policy by managerial elites at the English liberal campuses, and anti-
government petitions presented by the leadership of the black universities themselves. All 
of this resistance, while not being decisive on their own, played an important role in eroding 
the legitimacy of the Apartheid social formation.  
 
The running battles between students and police, mass meetings, demonstrations, boycotts, 
passionate debates between students of different ideological camps, teargas infested lecture 
rooms – all expressive manifestations of student political struggle on the black and some 
white campuses – transgressed the confines of the universities and impacted upon other 
areas of civil society marking those spaces as terrains of social conflict and protest. The 
resistance of black students from the 1970’s, together with the strikes, boycotts and 
stayaways of workers, youth and working class communities involved in pitched battles with 
the police constituted the social forces that created the crisis of Apartheid rule in the 1980’s. 
This broad spectrum of internal civil resistance, together with global, regional, and national 
factors, ushered the collapse of the Apartheid regime (Price, 1990). Indeed, it is arguable 
whether South Africa's democratic regime change, following the crisis of Apartheid rule in 
the 1980’s, would have occurred at all without the contribution of black students from the 
1970’s onwards. 
 
These practices of resistance are faint images to the present generation of students, a 
situation suggestive of the degree to which student life over the past ten years has become 
relatively “normal.” The democratic state intends higher education institutions to play a 
significant role in social transformation. Similar to post-authoritarian societies in the 1990’s 
and post-independence African states in the 1950’s (Coleman, 1994), the democratic South 
African state holds high developmentalist expectations for higher education institutions. In 
the main the state hopes that higher education institutions will contribute towards 
overcoming the legacies of the country’s racialised development, transform the society 
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along democratic and more equitable lines, and make the country more competitive in the 
global economic system. It is not self-evident that these goals complement one another and 
whether higher education institutions can or will rise to the challenges that have been posed 
for them by the new democratic government. 
 
As to be expected, the role universities can and ought to play in social transformation and 
the empirical role they do play is the focus of ongoing debate. Indeed, conflict over the core 
values concerning the direction, content, and quality of democratic social transformation – 
the subject of a broader societal discussion in political society, civil society and the state in 
the post-Apartheid period – has left the conversation of the role of universities and social 
transformation ongoing, passionate and the source of great complexity.  The transforming 
impact of higher education institutions in the economic, political, social, and cultural 
spheres of society is open to debate. Crucial questions relate to how best to utilise the 
existing resources and capacities of universities? How can higher education institutions be 
transformed to make them more responsive to social and political goals? What are likely 
sources driving such changes? To the extent that there maybe pockets of resistance to 
democratic change in the society and universities how do we deal with this? What should be 
the nature of limits to university autonomy in the context of state subsidisation and pressing 
socio-economic pressures on the democratic society?  
 
To begin with a heuristic generalisation we can identify two discourses of social 
transformation. The contours of the first emphasises quantitative, procedural changes to the 
“HE system”, the need for the “system” to be efficiently regulated and co-ordinated by the 
state, be more responsive to the real challenges posed by globalisation by creating a skilled 
workforce for the so-called “knowledge society.” The language of the present, the hard-
nosed realities facing a small, middle-range power with historical backlogs like South Africa, 
a country located in an under-developed conflict prone region, but having to respond to the 
freight-train of globalisation, animates this standpoint. To respond to the new realities, a 
new education lexicon, part state-speak, part populist and part specialist, is associated with 
this approach. In this framework the choices open to the state elite are limited by factors 
out of its immediate control. This framework can be called the realist-instrumentalist 
paradigm.  
 
The second nostalgically draws on the anti-Apartheid struggle for its bearings. It draws 
sustenance from the radical values popularised in the educational terrain of that struggle 
(the radical version of “peoples’ education”) as a template against which to evaluate post-
Apartheid developments. The priority of the democratic state should be to substantively 
redistribute resources, to assign a critical role to universities in producing educated, well-
rounded, Dewey-type citizens, and constantly reiterate the empowering quality of 
democratic society for those historically marginalized. The social conditions of those worst-
off under Apartheid, the conditions and the struggles of the past are fore-grounded. 
Education, according to this standpoint, must contribute to the radical, not reformist, 
transformation of society. Obviously, it is difficult to easily place interventions in the 
discussion about higher education and social transformation neatly into one of these camps; 
elements comfortably located in each of these frames of reference, points of departure 
really, to various degrees present themselves in the higher education language used since 
1994 within and outside the state. 
 
The state and civil society in South Africa since 1994 have undergone remarkable changes, 
yet the resilience of old practices and ideas remains the cause of immense frustration and at 
times, anger. The capacity of the state to steer change in the higher education sector is 
complicated by the nature of the transition, macro-economic policies associated with 
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dominant conceptions of globalisation, and significant cultures that want to resist 
deracializing changes within higher education in the terms posed under transformation 
discourses. Nevertheless, while the state may not be able to in the short-term change society 
entirely on the basis of its own vision using higher education institutions as instruments, 
longer-term changes in social relations are taking place through the “normal” functioning of 
these institutions.  
 
A marked development following the collapse of Apartheid is that rigid racially exclusive 
universities no longer exist. The resource-rich, formerly white universities have ceased to be 
the preserve of white students. The historically black universities are not repressive, 
dominating places where democratic, critical discussion is vigilantly policed. Most 
importantly, increasing numbers of first generation black students, mostly middle class but 
also from poor, rural, and urban working class backgrounds are entering higher education 
institutions. Initially, they went to the historically black universities, then increasingly, in 
fairly large numbers to some formerly white universities (Cooper, 2001). The 1980’s 
resistance generation may be inclined to view contemporary South African higher education 
institutions as becoming “normal universities”, where political activism has no intrinsic 
calling, competing with other pursuits attracting the interests of students. Yet, many of the 
struggles that motivated the 1980’s generation remain: the access of black women, working 
class, rural students in significant enough numbers to higher education institutions and to 
the leading universities in particular, the embarrassingly skewed racial composition of staff, 
where white academics dominate the key areas of university and academic life in all 
universities but especially at the historically white universities and technikons, and the need 
to restructure the curriculum to reflect the experiences, histories, cultures and politics of 
marginalized, subaltern discourses as these relate to the majority of continent-wide 
residents. The dominant institutional “ideologies”, everyday practices at universities, still 
have to undergo the social changes experienced by state institutions. In South Africa the 
state has changed, at least in the composition of its personnel, yet civil society, the sphere 
where higher education institutions find themselves, has some ways to go.  
 
 
2. The Higher Education System1 under racial oligarchy 
 
 
The Nationalist Party state introduced a new interventionist character into the relations 
between state and civil society as it relates to the terrain of higher education. Under 
Apartheid, the state was re-designed to organize civil society more firmly along the lines of 
"race" and ethnicity.  This translated into an administrative practice where all social services 
were provided separately and unequally. Each ethnic group required its own department, 
creating an enormous administrative and policing bureaucracy. There were departments of 
                                            
1 One of the new popular concepts in the language of higher education policy post 1994 is that of “system.” 
This word has multiple meanings in its usage but in contrast to the large philosophical and social science 
debate surrounding this term, in South Africa it has received very little or no critical attention. In the South 
African policy debates it tends to refer to order, structure and arrangement. The tendency is to identify 
features of the HE system and this move includes comparing the HAI’s and HDI’s, identifying the common 
and different features of each group, and largely discussing how each responds to the demands defined as 
crucial to contemporary South African society. It tends to be a “globalisation” related discourse. Somewhat 
contrasting this more conservative, mechanical conception of “system”, is the view that sees it as a standpoint, 
frame of reference, or worldview. In this view the HE system does not really exist, it is considered a heuristic 
device or metaphor that helps frame our discussion on higher education issues. The emphasis is on social 
transformation and the values drawn from the highpoint of the anti-Apartheid struggle are emphasized. Lastly, 
there are those who would avoid the use of the term completely, finding it for a variety of different reasons 
unhelpful to discuss higher education issues.  
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Native, Indian, and Coloured Affairs; and further sub-departments to deal with education, 
health, welfare and other services. The Bantustans (which ought to be considered as adjunct 
organs of the central state) further extended this bureaucratic network to dominate and 
monitor the population within its territories. The project was designed to establish and 
consolidate white identity and the economic, social and cultural domination by whites of the 
polity. Those classified as “non-whites” were expected to labour to serve white society and 
culturally assume roles and practices expressing subordination to secure the basis of white 
privilege and superiority. The program of racially determining social relations allowed the 
state to centralize, administer and uniformly impose its ideology on educational policy in 
line with its Apartheid project. 
 
The ideological functions of educational policy under Apartheid were designed to fit with 
the Apartheid social arrangement of society: it distributed educational resources unequally 
on the basis of "race", its objective was to "teach" subaltern youth that their Otherness 
(inferiority) was "natural", it aimed to imbue the subaltern child with an "ethnic" (tribal) 
cultural identity with the hope that it would identify with "its own" people and ethnically 
defined Bantustan, it aimed to constitute thoroughly docile subjects whose will to resist 
would be crushed and policed by themselves, and finally it aimed to establish two "types" of 
subaltern political classes--a small elite to operate the administrative structures of the 
subaltern (in the Bantustans and urban areas) and a labouring class to perform unskilled 
labour for the industrial economy (Reddy, 2000).  A differentiated higher education terrain 
was produced in keeping with the imperatives of the Grand Apartheid project. The 
unintended consequence was that the black universities created conditions that led to the 
emergence of student resistance. The latter helped create and sustain the internal resistance 
movement and together with structural factors (economic contradictions, regional changes 
and global pressures) helped produce the collapse of the Apartheid regime.  
 
 
2.1. A Differentiated Higher Education Sector 
 
The striking feature of higher education in South Africa is that its provision evolved and 
reproduced itself along racial and ethnic lines, prompted in large measure by deliberate state 
policy. It is imperative therefore to acknowledge that the emergence, roles, and cultures of 
universities in contemporary South Africa relate quite directly to the history of white 
political, economic and cultural domination and consequently higher education reflects the 
history of unequal relations of power perpetuated during colonial and Apartheid rule 
(Wolpe, 1991, Nkomo, 1990, Badat, 1999). Governments prior to World War 2 considered 
higher education to be a privilege exclusive to white society.   
 
Nearly a hundred years after the establishment of the first universities for whites, a 
university for black South Africans, Fort Hare, was established in 1916. The University of 
the Cape of Good Hope, the first white higher education institution, functioned as the 
administrative examining board, similar to the University of London, for the colleges of the 
Cape. These colleges were preparatory high schools for the colonial elite who went to 
Europe for university education. These early colleges inspired the establishment of 
universities.  The South African College (SACS) founded in 1829 evolved by 1918 into a 
fully recognised university, the University of Cape Town.  Afrikaner elites determined to 
establish their own university as part of their nationalist cause and conflict with the English, 
opened Victoria College in 1865, renamed Stellenbosch University in 1918 (Ade Ajayi, 1996, 
Cooper, 2001). Following the settlement of English immigrants in 1820, Rhodes University 
was established in the Eastern Cape. A School of Mines University in Johannesburg 
followed the mining revolution on the Rand. It opened in 1895, and became in 1922 the 
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University of the Witwatersrand. The federally organised University of South Africa 
(UNISA) had branch colleges around the country, serving these as the examining board, 
and from the 1930’s onwards these affiliated colleges became independent universities, 
resulting in the Universities of Natal, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, and Free State (Ade Ajayi, 
1996). All these institutions, save Fort Hare, served the white ruling classes. 
 
When the Nationalist Party government assumed power in 1948 the number of black 
students enrolled at universities stood at a mere 4.8% (Badat, 1991:48), mostly enrolled at 
the University of Fort Hare. This low number was typical for colonised Africa. The 
colonising administrations were reluctant to provide education to Africans. Eventually, 
primary education was grudgingly provided, yet Africans were consistently denied access to 
higher education. The ruling elites feared that higher education would produce anti-colonial 
and anti-racist resistance sentiments. This thinking was not too far off the mark, for the 
principal of Fort Hare, Mr Alexander Kerr, observed that his students were “obsessed with 
topics like the franchise, the colour bar and social segregation in public amenities and 
conveyances…They had a passionate faith in the efficacy of education to make good these 
and similar deficiencies” (Ade Ajayi, 1996:36). The continued denial of higher education to 
Africans made it an important demand of the broader struggle against colonial domination 
(Ade Ajayi, 1996).  
 
In South Africa during the initial decades of colonial rule the state refused to provide 
education for Africans. Christian Missions established primary schools and later high 
schools. The case of Fort Hare illustrates the states reluctance to support higher education 
for Africans. It took decades before Fort Hare received financial support from the state and 
South African business. James Stewart, the head of Lovedale College, proposed the idea of 
an African university in 1904 to the Colonial Native Affairs Commission. Identifying the 
need for trained African teachers, the Commission accepted the proposal. Initial funding 
was slow. The Presbyterian Mission gave 5 000 pounds. The Transkeian Territories General 
Council donated 10 000 pounds. The central Union government, after some years, 
contributed a paltry 600 pounds. The college, first referred to as the Inter-State Native 
College, later renamed the South African Native College, opened with 18 African men, 2 
African women, and 2 white students. The college was allowed to sit for the University of 
South Africa (UNISA) exams in 1923; only the white faculty were recognised as internal 
examiners. A donation of 75 000 pounds from the Chamber of Mines in 1935 allowed the 
college to expand, establishing faculties of science and medical education (Ade Ajayi, 1996). 
The administration remained under the control of the missions without much support from 
the state until the Apartheid regime stepped in. 
 
Instead of denying university education to blacks by relying on the admissions policies of 
the established white universities, the Apartheid state embarked on a determined policy to 
create universities for the variously state defined ethnically classified black groups. These 
new universities, the “bush colleges,” were designed to serve as valuable instruments in the 
over-arching “grand Apartheid” political project based on the creation of psuedo-
independent states in the African “tribal” reserves.  For Zulu and Swazi speakers the 
government created the University of Zululand. The University of the North was created 
for Sotho, Tswana, Venda, Tsonga speakers and the Transvaal Ndebele. The universities of 
the Western Cape and Durban-Westville were created for those classified Coloureds and 
Indians by the state (Horrell, 1968). By the early 1970’s universities were established in the 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda Bantustans. These institutions were expected to 
legitimate, reproduce, and constitute, especially among the elites, identities and social 
relations of race and ethnicity. If successful, this project would divide the black majority 
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into many minorities, weakening both the physical majority and the political, moral 
argument for democratic majority rule in an undivided South Africa.  
 
The racial differentiation of universities comfortably replicated the racial organisation 
prevailing in society. Society resembled an inflexible hierarchical structure, modelled like a 
pyramid with a minority classified as whites at the top and a large majority of blacks 
categorised by state policy into Africans, Coloured and Indian “groups” at the bottom. The 
Coloured and Indian groups were deliberately and controversially positioned to constitute 
what Van den Berghe calls “middle-man minorities” (Van den Berghe, 1987). 
Notwithstanding the verbal claims of administrators at the English language universities to 
have opposed Apartheid policies, the application of racially restrictive admissions criteria 
established by state policy and vigilantly policed at university level helped produce 
universities for Whites, Africans (divided into separate language groups), Indians, and 
Coloureds.   
 
As products of a central state vision, the historically black universities initially shared many 
common features marking them differently to the historically white institutions. Over time 
similar cultures of university administration, cooperation between student organizations and 
experiences of struggle and conflict, gave firmer foundations to claims of a common 
collective identity. History, culture, politics and conscious efforts by university elites created 
common institutional identities among the English and Afrikaner language universities 
respectively.  
 
The legacy of Apartheid state planning is the racial and ethnically fragmented higher 
education sector (Badat, 1999, Badat, 2002) 2. To speak of a single, homogenous higher 
education system is to over-generalise, misrepresent, and undervalue the past. At the time of 
the democratic transition the higher education “system” was composed of 21 universities 
and 15 technikons. We must be cautious when referring to this ensemble of institutions as a 
“system” where the latter denotes a mechanical arrangement of universities, colleges and 
technikons certifying advanced “knowledge and skills.” The system’s identity is at best quite 
tenuous. The differences between the units are fundamental and arguably more meaningful 
than their unifying “system” features. Through state policies, unequal funding, racially 
skewed student and staff composition, institutional histories, support from business, 
regional and local cultures in the surrounding environments of universities, and the varying 
impacts of the evolving social relations of power in the broader society, the higher 
education terrain displays marked differences in status, everyday material conditions, and 
capacities between those universities the education discourses of the new South Africa have 
come to label “historically advantaged” and those “historically disadvantaged” universities. 
The racially and ethnically differentiated configuration of universities resulted in institutions 
performing different roles in the overall system of domination, expressing different 
institutional capacities and cultures, and participating in different ways in the struggle 
against the Apartheid regime. To emphasise the differentiated identities of higher education 
institutions under Apartheid is to avoid referring to a broadly conceived role of higher 
education institutions in general; universities and units within universities played different 
roles in relation to the Apartheid power structure. The very notion of a university having a 
homogenous institutional culture is subject to persuasive critique.  
 
                                            
2 Engaging, acknowledging, re-presenting, and contesting the past lies at the heart of contemporary 
understandings of politics in South Africa. The higher education sector is not immune from this discussion. It 
is no coincidence, no surprise, that the terms used to name and categorise higher education institutions revolve 
on the “historical.” 
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2.2. State Re-structuring of Civil Society: White Universities 
 
The National Party mandated the Eiselen Commission, which released its report in 1951, to 
develop an educational policy for Black South Africans that was in line with the separate 
development project of Afrikaner nationalism. The Commission was asked to investigate 
any aspect of education for “Natives as an independent race, in which their past and 
present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their 
needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration” (Behr, 1988:32). 
The mandate made specific reference to the training of teachers and to “prepare Natives 
more effectively for their future occupations” (Behr, 1988: 32).  
 
The Commission proposed that the state should assume absolute control over African 
education under a newly created Department of Bantu Education. This meant removing 
control from religious bodies (Behr, 1988)3. The commission called for more input from 
local communities who would eventually bear the brunt of financing their children’s 
education. At the ideological level the Commission recognised the important role education 
could play in creating and reproducing particular types of racial and ethnic identities. It 
reiterated that education had to instil a sense of “race” pride and that the content of 
education be embedded within the cultural dimension of Africans as a “race.” While this 
notion of “race” as the fundamental starting point from which state policy derived had a 
long tradition within South African politics, the Commission gave it a more focussed, 
systematic, and administrative footing. Before this, state policy was ambiguously divided 
between seeking to “westernise” indigenous people and leaving “native” culture untouched 
without any state involvement in education at all. Instead, the Eiselen commission proposed 
that state directed education be rooted in specifically African “race culture,” conceived as a 
primordial essence.  
 
Verwoerd further expanded on the "philosophy" guiding state thinking on subaltern 
education, specifically linking the state’s conception of education with the social 
development of racial groups, all of which had its place within a grand Apartheid vision. 
It is the policy of my department that (Bantu) education should have its 
roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment and 
Native community. Bantu education must be able to give itself complete 
expression and there it will have to perform its real service. The Bantu 
must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no 
place for him in the European community above the level of certain 
forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are 
open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which 
has as its aim absorption in the European community while he cannot 
and will not be absorbed there. Up till now he has been subjected to a 
school system which drew him away from his own community and 
practically misled him by showing him the green pastures of the 
European but still did not allow him to graze there. This attitude is not 
only uneconomic because money is spent on education which has no 
specific aim, but it is even dishonest to continue with it. The effect on 
the Bantu community we find in the much-discussed frustration of 
                                            
3 In 1954 education for Africans was moved from the control of the Christian missions and placed under the 
Department of Bantu Education.   
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educated Natives who can find no employment which is acceptable to 
them (Behr, 1988: 36).  
When I have control of Native Education I will reform it so that the 
Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with 
Europeans is not for them...People who believe in equality are not 
desirable teachers for Natives...When my department controls Native 
education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is 
fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge... 
What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot 
use it in practice? That is quite absurd (Hirson, 1979: 45). 
 
In the 1960’s Apartheid planners implemented the vision of education to higher education 
outlined in the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. This Act reconfigured the 
existing higher education sector by steering black enrolment away from the established 
white universities and creating black universities, qualitatively different to the white 
universities, to which black students were forced to attend. The state led initiative produced 
remarkable compliance from the established universities. In October 1959 the government 
gazetted that from the following year no “non-white” person would be permitted to attend 
any university (except the University of Natal Medical School and the University of South 
Africa) without the permission of the Minister. The following year the government specified 
that from December 1960 no African would be allowed to study at an “open university.”4 
The Minister insisted that black students should attend the newly established black 
universities instead and only under exceptional circumstances, such as unavailability of a 
course at a black institution, would he consider allowing a black student to attend a white 
university.5   
 
The English language universities registered a sharp decline in black student numbers. 
These universities had always discriminated against black students, for even in the two 
institutions Wits and UCT that allowed black students to attend non-segregated lectures, 
segregated student residences and sporting facilities existed. 6 The other white universities 
had separate lectures for black students (Nkomo, 1990).7  A year after the legislation was 
passed, 190 African students applied for admission to the “open” universities. The Minister 
of Bantu Education granted permission to four students, yet astonishingly only two of the 
four students were admitted, one each to the universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand. 
                                            
4 Black students could not enroll for the following disciplines at the open universities: Chemistry, Physics, 
Zoology, Botany, Mathematics, Applied Mathematics, Geography, Psychology, Agriculture, Afrikaans, 
English, History, Economics, Commerce, Sociology, Social Work, Anthropology, Native Administration, 
Bantu Languages, Classical Languages, Philosophy, Political Science, Law or Divinity or in the Faculty of 
Education. (Horrell, 1968). 
5 Despite calls to boycott the black colleges by the Unity Movement and other progressive organisations, black 
students grudgingly and gradually enrolled. 
6 The Apartheid State relied on legislation, support of state ideology, and on funding to canalise admissions on 
racial and ethnic grounds. For example, as it relates to the Natal Medical School, the government transferred 
15 bursaries that used to be given to students at the University of Witwatersrand to the Natal Medical School. 
The government awarded bursaries to African students. If, according to the regulation, it could not find 
suitably qualified African applicants, the bursaries were offered to Coloured and then Indian students. The 
scholarship recipients who practiced in South Africa paid half the bursary back with interest; those who 
practiced outside South Africa had to pay back the full bursary (Horrell, 1968:117). 
7 The numbers of black students admitted were outrageously small. According to the National Commission of 
Higher Education (NCHE) report, the existence of discriminatory practices historically was not based on 
policy: “Prior to this Act the existing universities catered largely for whites. Although there was no legislation 
barring black people from any university at that point, universities were differentiated by race.” 
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The universities rejected the other two applications on academic grounds (Horrell, 
1968:115); in effect, in the entire country only two African students entered the “open 
universities.”  
 
The following table illustrates the drop in admissions at the white universities after the 
legislation in 1959. 
 
Table 1: Enrolment of African Students at Selected White Universities 1954-1968 
 
University 1954 1957 1959 1961 1965 1966 1967 1968 
UCT 26 29 39 18 5 3 2 3 
Wits 72 59 74 38 10 6 2 4 
Natal 102 181 187 181 132 141 133 161 
Unisa 555 1085 1252 1171 1310 1616 1863 2236 
Total 755 1354 1552 1408 1457 1766 2000 2404 
(Horrell, 1968: 116) 
 
While the numbers of African students admitted to UCT and Witwatersrand were low 
historically, an astonishing drop follows the passing of Apartheid legislation: At UCT 39 
African students registered in 1959, dropping to 18 in 1961 (46% drop) and 5 in 1965, the 
height of Apartheid. At the University of Witwatersrand, African student numbers dropped 
from 74 in 1959, to 38 in 1961 (51% drop) and 10 in 1965.  In both cases admissions of 
African students dropped by nearly 50% after the passing of the Apartheid legislation.  The 
enrolment figures for Natal University inflates the number of African students because, 
unlike UCT and Wits, it includes students from its all black Medical School.8  In keeping 
with government legislation, the university created the medical faculty to train “non-whites” 
in 1951, admitting in the first year of study 12 African students, 2 Coloured and 20 Indian 
students. The students did their practical training at the black King Edward VIII hospital. 
(Horrell, 1968:117).9  
 
Oddly, these universities and insider accounts of them tend to offer a re-presentation of 
their institutional histories that only highlights their anti-Apartheid stand. The UCT website 
characterises itself during the Apartheid years as follows, “Apart from establishing itself as a 
leading research and teaching university in the decades that followed, the period 1960 to 
1990 was marked by sustained opposition to apartheid, particularly in higher education” 
(www.uct.ac.za). In a similar vein Wits describes a glowing anti-Apartheid stance: “From the 
outset, [it] was founded as an open university with a policy of non-discrimination - on racial 
or any other grounds. This commitment faced its ultimate test when the apartheid-
government passed the Extension of the University Education Act in 1959, thereby 
enforcing university apartheid. The Wits community protested strongly and continued to 
maintain a firm, consistent and vigorous stand against apartheid, not only in education, but 
in all its manifestations. These protests were sustained as more and more civil liberties were 
withdrawn and peaceful opposition to apartheid was suppressed. The consequences for the 
                                            
8 In relation to the overall racial differentiation of higher education institutions, the Natal Medical School 
represented an ambiguously defined entity. It was a racially segregated black faculty in a white university; the 
main university did admit a few black students but they had to sit for segregated lectures, apart from their 
white counterparts. 
9 In 1968 130 Africans, 209 Indians and 31 Coloured students were registered at the Medical School; a 
disproportionate number of places were given to Indian students in comparison to African and Coloured 
students. In 1968 110 Africans, 111 Indian, 1 Chinese and 12 Coloured students completed their degrees. Just 
8 students went on to receive Masters Degrees; no African students were in this group. (Horrell, 1968:117). 
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University were severe - banning, deportation and detention of staff and students, as well as 
invasions of the campus by riot police to disrupt peaceful protest meetings.” 
(www.wits.ac.za). The claims of these institutions as implacably opposed to Apartheid 
policy and that, at the institutional level, they undermined the state’s racial discriminatory 
policies is inaccurate. The general compliance of these universities with state policy 
surprises and is difficult to explain given the autonomy exercised by these institutions, 
contested though this was, between the state and themselves. It might be that these 
institutions were unprepared to oppose the state for fear of the social penalties they would 
attract from the white constituencies that traditionally supported them. More likely these 
institutions shared the dominant practices and values of the racist society of which they 
were a part. Consequently, it was not very difficult for universities that had a history of 
reluctantly accepting black students to cooperate with Nationalist Party policy. 
 
 
2.3. State Re-structuring of Civil Society: The Emergence of the “Bush Colleges” 
 
The architecture of the black universities is revealing. It consisted of a balance between 
new, modernist buildings that, in the context of historical deprivation would attract new 
students and certainly impress their parents, and tactically designed to prevent, undermine 
and control possible student protest. Clearly modernist in expression, peppered with 
Roman columns here and there, the buildings were drab: cold concrete, low rise, with an 
effective “office block” look and feel. The Administration buildings assumed prominence, 
almost always near the entrance of the university, but also providing a strategic space from 
which to assert its panopticon-like eye throughout the campus. A “Great Hall” and the 
main library enclosed the central square, a space for students to gather and socialise in-
between lectures. Some distance away from the main campus stand the student residences, 
separate for male and female students. These consisted of single rooms for senior students 
and double rooms for junior students, “all with built-in cupboards, desks, and bookshelves 
(Horrell, 1968:119)”. The movement into and outside residences and between male and 
female residences was strictly policed. The sporting facilities would impress, particularly as it 
provided a stark contrast to the total absence of sports facilities in the black residential 
areas. Because students grudgingly entered these universities a boycott of sports facilities on 
campus was the first political campaign and the immaculate facilities remained unused for 
many years (until in the late 1980’s when SANSCO decided to adopt the strategy of using 
sports facilities to mobilise students who wanted to play sports). A strictly controlled, well-
guarded entrance monitored traffic into and out of the university property, the latter 
surrounded by high, barbed-wire fencing more closely resembling a prison than a university.  
The local campus police, responsible for monitoring and watching over students developed 
a notorious reputation and were predictably the first targets of student aggression. 
 
The emergence of the black universities marked an important change in the characteristics 
of white domination. There was a break with the historical exclusionary practice of ignoring 
black demands for access to higher education and relying on the elitist white universities (all 
of which patterned themselves on the British elitist model of higher education) to admit 
qualified black candidates. These practices resulted in an insignificantly small number of 
black students in higher education, a small minority that, despite its heroic efforts, could 
hardly make a major social, political and cultural impact on the black community 
experience.  
 
The new colleges broke the institutional foundations of this type of narrow elitism. A 
“mass-based” elitism unfolded, an elite that was more likely to impact on the community at 
large followed the increased numbers of black students in universities with black students 
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from different backgrounds and different parts of the country. Interestingly, the De Wet 
Nel Commission to draw up the Separate University Bill consciously worked with the 
notion of creating an elite that would identify with its own ethnic group, what Horowitz 
calls “ethnic entrepreneurs.” The commission saw the role of the black universities as 
encouraging each student “to play an active part, and train them in all facets of the process 
of development of the life of their group. The students should be the pioneers in the whole 
process of civilizing the ethnic group concerned.” (Nkomo, 1984: 60) The elite that 
eventually did take form distanced itself vehemently from all notions of ethnicity (especially 
at the political level), and instead embraced the idea of a larger community, the undivided 
oppressed group. 
 
While the low numbers of black students at the white universities dropped further, the 
development of the “bush colleges” increased the number of black students studying for 
higher degrees. Against the background of calls to boycott these institutions at first and 
despite the courageous sacrifices of certain individuals refusing to support “Apartheid 
institutions”, black students slowly and anxiously filtered into the new black universities. 
The students, given their poor schooling preparation in the natural sciences, the availability 
of many more programmes in the humanities and education fields and in many cases no 
programmes in the natural sciences at all, concentrated in the humanities and education 
fields (Badat, 1998:3).  
 
The table below shows the increasing enrolment at the University Colleges from 1960 to 
1968.  
 
Table 2: Enrolments at Selected Black Universities 1960-1968 
 
Year Fort Hare U of North Zululand UWC 
1960 360 87 41 156 
1961 344 129 53 213 
1962 242 194 94 NA 
1963 239 248 136 NA 
1964 272 305 180 NA 
1965 317 389 243 416 
1966 402 460 299 NA 
1967 436 537 341 560 
1968 451 611 368 669 
(Horrell, 1968: 125, SAIRR) 
 
In the eight years between 1960 and 1968, student numbers increased by 91 at Fort Hare, 
524 at the University of the North, 327 in Zululand and 513 at UWC. Essentially to 
legitimise the Apartheid project, the ironic effect was that more black students were taking 
higher education degrees than anytime previously. Although starting at a very low figure in 
relation to the white student population and in relation to the proportion of blacks making 
up the total South African population the black student population increased with each year 
after 1960 (actual number, relative to the total student population). Interestingly, if one 
accepts the claim of Cooper and Subotzky (2002) that South African higher education 
experienced a “revolution” in black student admissions to higher education institutions in 
the 1990’s with increases from 32% in 1990 to 60% in 2000, the increases between 1960 
and 1968 at the bush colleges will also constitute something of a “revolution” because at the 
University of the North, Zululand and UWC, black student numbers increased by 83% over 
the period.    
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The state succeeded in steering students to the universities designated for the ethnic group 
to which they were classified (Badat, 1998). The following table illustrates this shift 
numerically. 
 
Table 3: Ethnic Classification and Student Enrolment at the Black Universities 
 
Year African Coloured Indian White UNISA Total 
1960 488 161  1728 2004 4381 
% Dist ------------ ---14.8---- ----------- 39.4 45.8 100 
1965 956 416 1009 981 2911 6273 
% Dist  38  15.6 46.4 100 
1970 2011 936 1654 1106 3704 9411 
% Dist  48.9  11.8 39.3 100 
1976 5204 2438 3108 1550 10609 22.909 
% Dist ------------ ---46.9---- ----------- 6.8 46.3 100 
 
Of the total distribution of all students in the higher education system, 14.8% were enrolled 
in the ethnic universities in 1960. By 1976 this percentage increased to 46.9%.  
 
The state was apparently aware of the danger posed by the increased numbers of black 
students entering universities. It suspected the possibility of student protest.  The looming 
contradiction here is best comprehended in terms of the ideological trade-off that existed: 
There certainly was the goal, value and hope that the new institutions would inculcate an 
intense ethnic identity and consequent identification of students with their ethnic 
“homelands.” This was too important a need, almost a structural imperative of the political 
order. Yet also evident was the caution and worry of political cooperation and mobilization 
across institutions, which the state sought to prevent by repressing dissent at every turn.  
 
It located these universities in rural settings, far from centres that might attract students to 
critical cultural and political activity. The idea was to keep a distance from “politics”, to 
have students narrowly focus their attention on their studies without them asking broader 
questions about Apartheid society; the state assumed that political activism was only really 
attributable to the urban context.  The University of the North was located 18 miles from 
Pietersburg, the main urban centre in the then Northern Transvaal (Horrell, 1968). The 
University of the Western Cape, although located on the Cape Flats where Coloured and 
African working class areas are located, was surrounded by vast spaces of open, 
uninhabited, barren land, making any contact with the surrounding communities difficult. 
Similarly, the University of Durban-Westville was located alongside the white middle class 
suburb of Westville, on two hills, surrounding by deep ravines and valleys.  
 
A quick glance at the rules gazetted between 1959 and 1960 relating to the black universities 
suggests how different these were from “normal” universities, despite the efforts of the 
state to “market” them as such to the relevant communities: 
 
1. “Students may not leave the college precincts without permission from the Hostel 
Superintendent or a representative duly authorized by the Rector; 
2. Any students organization or organizational work in which students are concerned is 
subject to the prior approval of the Rector; 
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3. No meetings may be held in the grounds of the college without permission from the 
Rector. Approved student committees may meet in accordance with the rules of the 
constitution of the body concerned; 
4. No magazine, publication or pamphlet for which students are wholly or partly 
responsible may be circulated without the permission of the Rector in consultation with 
the Advisory Senate and the Senate; 
5. No statement may be given to the Press by or on behalf of the students without the 
Rector’s permission” (Horrell, 1968:121) 
6. At Fort Hare students had to re-apply for admission and the application had to include 
a “testimonial of good conduct by a Minister of Religion or a Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner or Magistrate of the district where the applicant normally resides” 
(Horrell, 1968:121). This became a regular rule at all Black institutions following student 
boycotts. The University of the North required students to produce a testimonial that 
was to the “satisfaction of the authorities.” In many cases returning students had to sign 
new contracts with the university promising not to participate in political activities, that 
their parents will be held responsible for damages, and that their parents would be 
charged the full fees for the semester in which they may be expelled. 
  
These rules placed enormous power in the office of the Rector, who was invariably a 
leading member of the Nationalist Party and Broederbond. The senior positions at these 
institutions were given to faculty from the Afrikaans universities or high-ranking civil 
servants in the Department of Bantu Affairs. Generally, the entire teaching staff came from 
the Afrikaner institutions; many young Afrikaner graduates began careers in these 
institutions because of the unavailability of vacancies in the established Afrikaner 
universities. Most of the teaching faculty and staff tended to be politically conservative, 
card-carrying members of the ruling party, and vigilantly displayed a policing, authoritative, 
and demeaning attitude towards the students.  The teaching curriculum fitted comfortably 
within a positivist, Christian National Education paradigm (Enslin, 1984). 
 
The table below indicates the numbers of academics in the different categories, comparing 
white and black staff numbers at the black universities in 1972.10  
 
Table 4: Staff Profile at Black Universities in 1972 
 







White Black White Black White Black White  
Fort Hare 2 28 2 33 9 29 4 1 108 
U of North 5 26 3 33 21 33 6 - 127 
UWC - 17 1 24 3 26 - - 70 
Zululand 1 17 2 40 6 16 - - 82 
UDW 1 23 5 46 24 56 12 10 177 
 9 111 12 176 63 160 21 11 563 
(Black Review 1972: 173) 
 
Out of 563 academic staff there were only 9 black professors, 12 black senior lecturers and 
just 63 lecturers. By contrast there were 111 white professors, 176 white senior lecturers and 
                                            
10 This characteristic has remained a feature of South African universities ever since, and is another of the 
major challenges facing the new government. 
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160 white lecturers. The key personnel in the University Council and senior management 
level were entirely white. They appeared to the students as the direct representatives of the 
state on the campuses. The black academics were in a difficult position. Occupying 
positions of some respect in apartheid-created institutions, they were caught in the middle 
between the growing radicalisation of students and the watchful eye of the university 
management. Besides, they had their own struggles and frustrations as black academics in 
deeply discriminatory university contexts. Some identified with the political demands of the 
students. Others were passive participants, as is always the case in such situations, wanting 
to get on with their jobs without getting involved in “politics”. The more militant black 
consciousness activists looked upon this group suspiciously, unless they took a visible stand 
against the university authorities or identified with the emerging student and community 
politics.  
 
The development of black universities, increased student numbers, and the repressive and 
conservative cultures within these institutions failed to successfully establish social control 
in keeping with the visions of the architects of higher education planning. Ironically, the 
growth of black university student numbers between 1960 and 1976 studying courses in the 
humanities and education, the repressive conditions on the black campuses, and the 
conservative stance of the teaching staff created the conditions that contributed to student 
unrest. After an initial period of passivity, increasing student frustration and alienation 
produced student organisations and campaigns for university reforms. Student boycotts 
became so frequent that by the mid-1980’s the black universities could be defined as places 
of perpetual “unrest.” The rising middle class finding prospective avenues closed, frustrated 
by the racist social order, and imbued by the culture of a nationalist resistance, assumed a 
ready and dynamic role in the processes of resistance and transformation in South Africa. 
By the 1980’s the black tertiary education sector constituted a vibrant terrain of conflict 
with the Apartheid state.  
 
 
3. The Political Struggle against Apartheid: Student Politics 
 
 
At the time of the Soweto uprisings in 1976 three trends, all contributing to the 
development of student organisations and resistance, are identifiable. First, black student 
numbers increased at the universities providing the immediate basis for political 
mobilisation and truly effective mass protest. Second, the comprehensive separation of 
students into ethnic institutions and the visibly repressive atmosphere prevailing at the black 
university colleges in stark contrast to the established white universities, which more closely 
resembled the “normal” university, alienated, angered and frustrated black students. The 
differences in the material conditions on the campuses constituted another basis for 
common “black” student identification and mobilisation. Third, the ‘new’ institutional 
vision of the higher education system, designed to reproduce Apartheid social relations, 
especially its objective to constitute ethnic subaltern subjects, produced new, protest-based 
identities derived from the spread of black consciousness ideas and practices. Indeed, a 
convincing correlation exists between the emergence of the emphasis on a new black 
identity and black solidarity and the material conditions prevailing in the ethnic universities. 
 
 
3.1. Progressive Constituencies and Practices Aligned to the Student Struggle 
 
Because black students constituted a “social force” that interacted directly with community 
structures of resistance during the national uprisings from the mid-1970’s onwards, the 
 20
primary focus of our discussion is on student politics.  The intention however is not to 
ignore, marginalize and undermine the roles of other constituent actors within higher 
educations who contributed significantly to the internal resistance movements. Notable here 
are the few, but crucial contexts “won over” by progressive groups at the mainly white 
liberal campuses which served as important “protected spaces” for resistance activity, 
discussion, and debate (especially in the 1970’s and 1980’s). In the rare instance almost 
entire academic departments (often in sociology and/or history) assumed progressive 
stances, sympathising with the national political struggle. The curricula of these departments 
challenged conventional, traditional, and modernization analyses of South African history 
and social order. In History, the subject most closely and emotively associated with the 
ideological imperatives of the Apartheid state and counter narratives of subaltern resistance, 
an intense debate between Afrikaner, Liberal and Marxist historiography erupted in the 
1970’s.  Many young, white academics who pursued postgraduate studies at British 
universities, returned to the English-speaking universities (and some “bush colleges”) 
having been exposed to and influenced by Marxist (structuralist and social history) 
perspectives. These intellectuals applied Marxist analysis to the study of South African 
history, and by the late 1970’s an impressively large body of work advocating the centrality 
of the emergence of capitalism in the late 19th century and class struggle assumed 
prominence in some circles of the academy.11 In addition to the earlier radical scholarship 
already present in the traditions of the ANC, PAC and Unity Movement, Marxist 
understandings of the Apartheid state and society became dominant frameworks within 
which “struggle” languages expressed themselves.  As the forces of anti-Apartheid grew 
post-1976, the dissemination of university based progressive academic literature providing 
alternative frameworks of understanding and interpretation made an important impact, 
adding to the vibrancy of debate associated with the period.12  
 
In some cases individual progressive academics carved out within university structures 
spaces for alternative, anti-Apartheid activity. This took the form of including in 
coursework articles by famous academics in exile such as Harold Wolpe, Baruch Hirson, 
and Martin Legassick, organising seminars addressing politically sensitive topics, and 
inviting known political activists to speak at university gatherings. Those academics more 
deeply embedded in the liberation movement, such as Richard Turner, Neil Agget and 
Eddie Webster, pursued an individual agenda of assisting, organising, and participating 
directly in the various resistance campaigns blurring the lines between university and 
resistance practices. An interesting example is that of the Wages Commission based at the 
University of Natal. Formed in the early 1970’s by students and staff the group played an 
important role in conducting work on the state of labour relations in the country, as well as, 
developing strong ties of solidarity with the emerging trade union movement.  Besides these 
expressions of university-based activism, black and white intellectuals with strong ties to 
individual universities actively used the university as a space to pursue resistance work. 
These took the forms of producing community based magazines/journals such as Work In 
Progress, directly producing popular articles on various issues of resistance politics and 
disseminated via community publications, and creating and participating in interest based 
organisations to organise university based academic constituencies.  
 
                                            
11 This work emphasized class and capitalist relations and in so doing set off an intense debate concerning the 
relationship between race and class factors in our understanding of the nature of Apartheid domination and 
the most appropriate strategies to overcome it. 
12 The research produced within university structures escaped beyond narrow fora, as one would observe in 
the range of publications reflecting an academic, yet populist character which had widespread distribution. For 
example Work in Progress. 
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Notwithstanding that extensive research remains to be conducted documenting and 
analysing the activity of the various constituents other than students who made and utilised 
certain spaces within universities for resistance activity, the following section describes the 
state of student resistance in the 1960’s. It traces the political and social conditions that 
produced the resurgence in widespread student mobilization, influencing the contours of 
political struggle in the broader society.  The first part discusses the politics within the 
National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), followed by an overview of black 
student political activity at the mainly black universities from the 1970’s.  
 
 
3.2. NUSAS and Black Students 
 
The main student organisation, the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) 
was formed in 1924. It was a predominantly white student organization, including English 
and Afrikaner students of the nine white universities. In its formative years NUSAS 
focussed mainly on uniting English and Afrikaner students; at the ideological level this 
involved accommodating English conservative liberalism and Afrikaner Christian 
nationalism. The political debates in white politics between the pro-British position of 
Smuts, the moderate Afrikaner nationalism of Hertzog and the radical ethnic nationalism of 
Malan, reflected themselves in NUSAS.  Afrikaner students left the organisation and 
formed first the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS) and later, the Afrikaanse 
Studentebond (ASB). NUSAS was left with English students who embraced a conservative 
liberalism under the influence of the United Party.  
 
In the 1950’s NUSAS' adopted a non-racial stance bringing it into conflict with the 
Nationalist government and its educational policies of Christian national education for 
whites and education of servitude for blacks. The organization opposed the implementation 
of Bantu Education in 1954 and the Extension of University Education Act in 1959, 
creating separate universities for blacks and the restructuring of Fort Hare.13 The NUSAS 
leadership was torn between the radical demands of black students and its conservative 
student membership.14 Black student leaders were unhappy that NUSAS concentrated too 
much on narrow academic matters, such as the erosion of "academic freedom" (Davies, 
1988:282) and did not address itself to the larger political questions facing the country.  
 
NUSAS developed an ambiguous relationship to black students. The organization rejected 
the request from students of Fort Hare to join in 1933 (Davies, 1988: 381). After World 
War 2, against the background of anti-fascist sentiment and the resurgence of African 
protests in the country, NUSAS opened its membership to black students from Fort Hare. 
About the same time black politics shifted towards a radical Africanist nationalism, 
expressed in the founding of the Youth League of the African National Congress led by 
Anton Lembede, and eventually the Pan Africanist Congress. This ideology emphasised 
African unity and culture, opposed alliances with white organizations, and saw little merit in 
the South African liberal tradition. However, during the intensely repressive period in the 
                                            
13 The English language universities were essentially conservative, and although NUSAS professed a liberal 
outlook, very few white students actually questioned Apartheid. On the campuses, voting for SRC elections 
did not exceed more than a quarter of the student body. The small minority of active NUSAS members found 
it challenging to engage the large inactive, conservative mass of white students. Its protest was consequently 
largely symbolic.   
14 Two tendencies emerged in the NUSAS leadership: a radical liberal wing wanted NUSAS to assume a more 
active role in the political struggle of blacks; a liberal/conservative wing wanted the organization to restrict 
itself to primarily student issues and concerns, which gained influence in the sixties. 
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mid-1960s that follows the Sharpeville shootings, no comparative student organization 
existed for black students. Many black students decided to work within NUSAS.  
 
A prominent conflict surrounding the recognition of racially exclusive clubs on campus 
brought such tensions into the open. This issue reflects the frustrating political atmosphere 
that black students were up against. It revealed the limitations of NUSAS and its focus on 
white student concerns as well as the racism of university administrations. In July 1967, 
Conservative students from the main English campuses met in Johannesburg and decided 
to form a national organisation for white students. Shortly thereafter the South African 
Students Union was launched at UCT to serve as the real union of white students in 
opposition to NUSAS which they accused of pandering to the few blacks in its 
membership. The previous year the Conservation Students Association (CSA) launched a 
local branch at UCT restricted to whites. NUSAS did not accept it for affiliation, rejecting 
its racially defined constitution. The government, not unsurprisingly, supporting the trend 
towards white exclusivist organisations on the English campuses and initiated the 
Universities Amendment Bill and the Extension of University Education Amendment bill. 
The first bill, if passed, would over-rule the NUSAS objection as it protected any person 
advocating or promoting any form of racial separation. The second bill prohibited the 
admission of any black person to a white university without ministerial permission and 
prevented any black student from joining student organisations except those belonging to 
his/her own ethnic group or those restricted to academic matters (SAIRR, 1967: 281). 
 
The UCT administration, in early 1967 appointed a commission under the chairmanship of 
Mr Justice M.A.P. Diemont to investigate student bodies. The commission favoured a less 
political, anti-government NUSAS. It drew up a new SRC constitution accepting clubs and 
societies whose membership was racially discriminatory, provided the club presented 
reasons for its restrictive membership. The University Council accepted the new 
constitution. Realising the university administrations were acting in accordance with 
government thinking, the Minister of Education withdrew the proposed Bills saying that 
they were no longer necessary (SAIRR, 1967: 281).  
 
To black students, assigned to the inferior university colleges ("bush colleges"), scattered far 
and wide in the rural areas, the issue of racially exclusive campus clubs affiliated to NUSAS 
signalled the conservative shift in white student politics and the general endorsement by 
white students of the racial social structure. Besides, these students were faced with a host 
of politically related issues: security police harassment, spies on campus, non - 
representation through SRC's, inferior educational facilities, curricula that ignored the racial 
issues of the society, and poor accommodation and food at the residences. NUSAS did not 
campaign against these conditions.  For black students the major focus was the abolition of 
Bantu education and radical changes in the society as a whole. 
 
Frustrated, Steve Biko and other black delegates walked out of the 1967 NUSAS Congress 
in protest and launched the South African Students Organisation (SASO) a few months 




                                            
15 The proceedings of the NUSAS conference in 1967 reflected the organisation’s conservative stance towards 
contemporary South African politics. A resolution calling on SRCs to abolish racial discrimination on the 
English universities was passed by 42 votes, 2 votes opposed and 20 abstentions. The congress condemned 
the government’s restrictions on the press, framing it as a threat to academic freedom. 
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3.3. SASO and Black Consciousness 
 
An appreciation of the broad context of the 1970s in South African politics is important to 
put into perspective the formation of SASO and the emergence of the different message 
that black consciousness entailed. Some key contextual factors of this period include the 
following: 
• An organizational and “ideological” vacuum following the bannings of the ANC and 
PAC;16  
• The draconian security conditions, a large coercive, intrusive state apparatus compelling 
widespread fear of “politics” (broadly defined) among black people. The pervasiveness 
of this fear, its manifestations and how to effectively move beyond it was imaginatively 
developed within black student leadership circles; the idea of a conscious “black” 
identity as a sign of defiance was one of the creative contributions of Black 
Consciousness ideology; 
The success of state-led import-substitution-industrialisation policies, the economic boom 
of the sixties nationally and globally, produced a South African capitalism with all the 
contradictions relating to the close over-lapping of class, race and gender exploitation; 
The ambitious "social engineering" state policy of physically separating blacks along ethnic 
lies in the Bantustan project that created a complicated and complex political system that 
was intrinsically unable to generate its own reproductive legitimacy; 
The fragmented resistance from black quarters, the important, dominating political space 
occupied by liberals (mainly white) and the "homeland" leaders, while the society became 
increasingly racially polarised.  
 
Representatives from black higher education institutions met at Mariannhill, approved the 
formation of SASO and publicly launched the organisation at the University of the North 
(Turfloop) in July 1969.17  Steve Biko was unanimously elected president. SASO embarked 
on a series of workshops to popularise the organization. “Formation schools” (as they were 
                                            
16 The banning of the political organisations active during the 1950’s civil disobedience campaigns affected 
student organisation more seriously than other areas. For black student supporters of the PAC and ANC, the 
exile of these organizations left them without structures to recruit students, promote their respective 
ideologies, and mount resistance campaigns against the regime. Yet sympathies and allegiances towards these 
movements never declined and the politically aware students continued to be interested in them. At Fort Hare 
three political movements, the larger groups of the ANC and PAC, and the relatively smaller following of the 
Unity Movement, competed for student support. Each group formed its own student organization: the 
Congress Alliance formed the African Students Association (ASA), the Africanist students, the African 
Students Union of South Africa (ASUSA) and the Unity Movement, the Progressive National Students 
Organization (PNSU). The PNSU merged the Durban Students Union and the Cape Peninsula Student Union.  
When the Africanists and Unity Movement students defined their organizations as "unions", they were 
indicating their opposition to NUSAS, characterising their organisations as alternatives to NUSAS. NUSAS 
however remained the only internationally recognised representative of all South African students. Unlike 
ASUSA and PNSU, the pro-ANC, ASA defended the role of NUSAS, considering it to be integral to the 
struggle for democracy and the “multi-racial” ideology it advocated.  
17 The predecessor organisation of SASO was the University Christian Movement (UCM). From 1966 
onwards many black students began to participate increasingly in the University Christian Movement (UCM), 
an organisation more receptive to black student opinion. The UCM started out as a multi-racial organization 
and began to explore Black Consciousness ideas from a theological perspective. Between late 1966 and 1968, 
the year SASO was formed, the UCM served to bring black students together, help them determine their own 
political agenda, and provide a platform to formulate a longer-term political programme. Under conditions of 
fearful repression, where “deaths in detention” became more common, maintaining organisational contact was 
important and a Christian organisation was less likely to attract the attention of the security agencies. 
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called) provided black students with forums to develop their own ideas and political 
programmes. At the first "formation school", held at the Natal University Medical School in 
December 1969, Biko talked about the significance, role and future of SASO (Stubbs, 1988: 
4).18  The basic and immediate aims of SASO were to: 1) Mobilise black students by 
increasing contact nationally, 2) Identify crucial issues/grievances that affected black 
students, 3) Represent the interests of the black students, 4) Establish a solid and strong 
identity to boost black students’ confidence in themselves, and 5) Begin concrete 
programmes to respond to pertinent issues to get the majority of black students directly 
involved in SASO activities (Stubbs, 1988:4-5). Forming an independent black organisation 
was not a support of government policy, but was a realistic response according to Biko: 
what SASO has done is simply to take stock of the present scene in the country and to 
realise that not unless the non-white students decide to lift themselves from the doldrums 
will they ever hope to get out of them. What we want is not black visibility but real black 
participation (Stubbs, 1988:5). 
 
The new stance allowed blacks to break their dependence on white society, to develop a 
confidence in themselves and to work out their own strategies and ideas about liberation. 
The slogan "we are 'black' students and not black 'students' popularised the importance of 
establishing strong ties to local communities. The attendance at the July 1970 SASO 
conference displayed widespread representation from most black tertiary institutions, with 
affiliated SRC's of the universities of the North, Fort Hare, Zululand, Natal Medical School. 
Where SRC structures did not exist, SASO branches were formed as at UDW and UWC.  
 
The Black Consciousness (BC) ideology developed in close association with the practical 
activities of SASO. The rapid, but somewhat surprising, immediate proliferation of Black 
Consciousness ideas to communities via hundreds of local organisations, and the 
consequent resurgence in black political activity, led SASO to help initiate a national black 
political organisation, called the Black Peoples Convention (BPC). Its preamble suggests its 
intention to challenge the structures of power in the society at large since the BPC saw itself 
as a movement of black people, rejecting any form of tribal affiliation and ethnic 
mobilisation. Most SASO members became senior leaders in the BPC and Biko was made 
the Honorary President because of his banning order that restricted him to the King 
Williamstown area.  
 
By the mid-1970s the black consciousness movement had established a host of 
organisations, and many community organisations already in existence, associated with its 
ideology. A loose, mosaic of organisations, of women, workers, students, youth, cultural 
arts, brick-building, pottery etc., located at local, regional and even national levels, linked in 
various ways to one another, contributed to creating a renaissance in black civic and 
political culture. It was intrinsically a culture of opposition. When the students in Soweto 
revolted against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in their schools, 
they were manifesting a new assertiveness that came with the cultural context of protest 





                                            
18 In this presentation Biko interestingly and provocatively locates SASO in the tradition of the resistance 
struggle, specifically to the post-Sharpeville failures of black resistance: the lack of unity, a “cementing” 
ideology, weak black leadership. NUSAS was “structurally” unable to facilitate black interests and consequently 
the situation black students found themselves made it necessary to form an organization representing their 
interests, independent of whites. 
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3.4. SASO and Bantu Education: The Student Boycott becomes Commonsense 
 
Two events in the 1970’s contributed to the culture of revolt that took hold among 
students, youth and local communities in the 1980’s. The first was the 1972 boycotts which 
began at the University of the North, and the second was the 1976 Soweto rebellion.  SASO 
campaigned against Bantu education. When the administration of the University of the 
North expelled Mr Onkgopotse Ramothibi Tiro, the SRC president, the students boycotted 
classes to demand his reinstatement. The boycott spread rapidly to other black universities. 
The students criticised Bantu education and the entire Apartheid political order. Against the 
background of a rampant, confident racist regime, widespread fear of the dreaded security 
police, a generalised political apathy pervading black communities and an organisational 
“vacuum” in black politics, the May-June 1972 student boycott was an important 
development in protest politics.19  
 
Tiro was expelled after this speech. Grossly angered, and realising that Tiro expressed their 
feelings of frustration and alienation from the broader social order, the students began a 
boycott of classes, an act whose significance looms large because the last such major act of 
collective student protest took place in the early 1960’s, almost a decade earlier. From the 
University of the North the boycott spread to the Universities of the Western Cape, 
Zululand, Durban-Westville, the M.L. Sultan Technical College and the Natal Medical 
School. Some white students at the University of Cape Town demonstrated in solidarity 
with the black students. Tiro was never re-instated (he was assassinated by the regime in 
exile), but with the involvement of community organisations representing parents, the 
university administrations felt pressured to accept returning students without penalties.20  
At the political, cultural and symbolic levels, the 1972 boycott opened the way for the 
recurring use of the boycott strategy, so much so, that by the 1980’s it became a regular 
aspect of black community life. It was the first in a series of student protests, of clashes 
between the students, university administrations and the police, culminating in the 
memorable 1976 township revolts and the countrywide civil uprisings in the 1980’s.  
 
The spread of BC beyond a small group of university students, and the experience of the 
1972 boycotts contributed towards a rejection of Apartheid education in most urban areas. 
At about the same time as the resurgence in the student movement, black workers 
increasingly went on strike demanding wage increases, union recognition, and improved 
                                            
19 In his address to the graduation ceremony Tiro openly criticised government policy; the magnitude of this 
courageous intervention can only be appreciated against the repressive context of the time. He called for “real 
education for all South Africans and not the compartmentalised ‘education’ for Coloureds, for ‘Bantus’ and for 
Indians.” He criticised the dominance of whites at the university, that blacks were not consulted on any 
important decisions, and that the Advisory Council was not elected by the parents and included members 
without any university experience. During university holidays white students were given jobs instead of the 
poorer black students attending the university. The university authorities completely disrespected blacks 
because at the graduation ceremony the “Black parents were relegated to the back of the hall and even locked 
out whilst whites were seated in front on an occasion to mark the achievements of black students” (Khoapa, 
1972:174/5). 
20 The 1972 boycott, according to Gerhart, had the following consequences: 1) Tiro's expulsion received 
extensive press coverage which immediately assisted in the spread of black consciousness outside student 
ranks to the black community at large; 2) the boycotts led to the younger generation accepting black 
consciousness, after admiring the courage of their older brothers and sisters; 3) it assisted in increasing the 
level of political consciousness among high school students; and 4) because of the increased political 
awareness amongst the youth, it led to the growth of youth organizations, co-ordinated nationally through the 
activities of South African Students Movement (SASM) and National Youth Organisation (NAYO) (Gerhart, 
1978: 274-80). 
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working conditions. The watershed event that changed the terrain of labour relations was 
the "spontaneous" strike wave during 1973.   
 
The 1976 student-led revolt was strongly related to the campaigns against Bantu Education 
and the boycotts of university students. When the Department of Bantu Education in 1974 
sent a circular to African schools instructing them that Afrikaans would from 1975 be the 
language of instruction in 50% of the subjects, the scene was set for a confrontation 
between black students and the state. Those schools where the South African Students 
Movement (SASM) was strongly organised such as at Orlando West, Naledi High and 
Morris Isaacson boycotted classes from mid-May 1976. On the 16th June, SASM planned a 
mass rally of Soweto students at Orlando Stadium.  Police units shot into the demonstrating 
crowd, killing Hector Pieterson, the first of over 600 students, youth, and adults killed by 
the police.  
 
Students responded by burning buildings associated with the Bantu Affairs Department, 
police stations, beer-halls, cars, barricading whole sections of the township and attacking 
known policemen. The unrest spread from Soweto to townships around the Transvaal, the 
Western Cape and Natal. After months of the student boycott, and three stayaways bringing 
downtown Johannesburg to a standstill, the state eventually regained control, but only after 
detaining thousands of activists and banning all black consciousness organizations on the 19 
October 1977, prompting thousands of young people, mostly students, to leave the country 
and join the armed wings of the ANC and PAC. The exodus of youths, radicalised by black 
consciousness ideas and hardened by the experience of the revolt, resulted in the 
intensification of the armed campaign in the post-Soweto period, a period during which the 
Apartheid elites and the regime initiated a series of reform measures to re-organise the 
relations of domination. 
 
The conditions at black universities contributed to the politicisation of black students. Their 
location in the rural areas, far from urban complexes, the state’s emphasis on ethnically 
restricting the student body, the predominantly Afrikaner staff that was politically 
conservative, the close association of the residences, the brutal violence of the police against 
peaceful protest, and the emergence of a culture of political resistance from the early 1970’s 
associated with the black consciousness movement, all contributed in some way to student 
resistance.  An analysis of the “micro-physics” of resistance, apprehend in “thick 
description,” would describe in detail the mass meetings, pamphlets; songs; dances (the 
“toyi toyi” as student, youth and community cultural practice), the way leadership was 
produced in the various boycotts, languages used at mass meetings, resolutions, the mixture 
of local ideologies with different versions of Marxism and revolutionary language. This 
culture of resistance politics drew upon and used in interesting ways knowledge of 
comparative cases of successful revolution, and displayed an overwhelming interest in 
Marxism. Intense debates on tactics, strategies, and principles became the order of the day. 
Emotions reached fever pitch, sometimes breaking out in violent clashes as arguments 
about what types of organisational, ideological and political practices constituted 
collaboration and what constitutes the best conditions for negotiation. Often studies of 
student resistance focus primarily on overt/ public forms of resistance, not on the 
“everyday” and often “hidden transcripts” of resistance. This paper does not address these 
issues, it surely alerts us to them, and suggests that they are important for our understanding 





4. The Reform Strategy of the Apartheid State 
 
 
Soon after suppressing the Soweto revolt, the government established the Wiehann and 
Riekert Commissions of Enquiry. Wiehann investigated labour relations and Riekert was 
given the broad mandate to look into "the utilisation of manpower" (Lodge, 1983: 336-9, 
Murray, 1987), a metaphor to find a solution to the causes frustrating urban blacks. Both 
proposed reforms to existing government policy. Wiehahn recognised black trade unions 
for the first time, scrapped job reservation, and accepted racially "mixed unions". Riekert 
recommended relaxing the pass laws, by allowing industrial workers and the African middle 
class to reside permanently in urban areas. For those outside these designated groups, it 
wanted to intensify the policing of the pass laws, in effect keeping rural migrants out of the 
urban zones and reducing the dependence of South Africa’s capitalist economy on migrant 
labour. The government also announced what it saw as far-reaching changes at the 
constitutional level. A new constitution, creating three separate legislative chambers for 
Whites, Coloureds and Indians, was to take effect in 1983; those classified African 
according to the proposals were to vote in elections for local, municipal councils, without 
representation at the national level.  
 
The Botha reforms of the 70s and early 80s aimed to reinforce the dominant position of 
white society by undermining the radicalisation of the black opposition. The reforms 
stimulated a gigantic wave of popular mobilisation, on a variety of fronts, challenging the 
state and Apartheid rule in general. Strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and riots spread 
across the country and by the mid-1980’s the ANC and its internal supporters could claim 
that the country was “ungovernable.” The state had lost control of large sections of the 
society and was unable to restore any obedience to the basic rules of social intercourse 
reproducing the existing relations of domination. New terrains and spaces of conflict 
opened up; with increasing numbers of ordinary citizens questioning everyday forms of 
domination. Of the hundreds of organisations actively involved in the 1980’s revolt mainly 
under the rubric of the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front, the student organisations, 
the Azanian Students Organisations (AZASO) and the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS) and to a lesser extent the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) and other 
organisations affiliated to the National Forum, kept the momentum of the student boycotts 
alive; schools remained closed and students, together with the unemployed youth, led the 
daily battles against the police. COSAS and AZASM rejected the Department of Education 
and Training (DET) proposals accepting limited student representation on school 
governing structures; they drew up counter constitutions instead. The students supported 
the formation of parents committees, culminating in the founding in 1986 of the National 
Education Crisis Committee (NECC). Until "alternative educational structures" and 
"peoples power" were achieved, COSAS called for the continuation of the schools boycott. 
AZASM rallied around the slogan "education for liberation". Hundreds were shot. 
Thousands jailed. From 1984 until 1988, South Africa experienced a crisis of rule (Murray, 
1987).    
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PART TWO 
THE POST 1994 PERIOD: THE TRANSITION, HIGHER 
EDUCATION POLICY AND IMPACT 
 
 
5. Understanding the South African Democratic Transition: Transplacement 
 
 
The reform of South African higher education institutions post-1994 and the capacities to 
implement them is best related to the nature of the democratic transition, the relationship 
between the state and civil society under particular macro-economic policies, and processes 
internal to universities and the higher education sector itself (Badat, 1995). We now turn to 
these themes. 
 
The transition of the regime from an Apartheid authoritarian one to a democratic political 
system did not amount to a fully-fledged social revolution, where the latter in Skocpol’s 
sense, means the fundamental change of both the state and class structures brought about 
by large-scale uprising from below. The change of regime was substantive but limited in 
most respects to the political realm.  
 
The path describing the transition is of paramount importance to understanding the 
capacity of the new democratic state. South Africa's democratic transition can be located in 
the so-called Third Wave of democratisation. From the mid-1970s onwards many societies 
changed regime types, from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones.21 Transition 
theorists classify three types of democratic transition: 1) Transformation: when those in 
power take the lead and play the decisive role in ending the authoritarian regime; 2) 
Replacement: when those in the Opposition are stronger than the regime forces and the 
Opposition determines the collapse of the old regime; and 3) Transplacement: when both 
regime elites and Opposition elites together determine the collapse of the old regime. Each 
type of transition is likely to produce a certain configuration of the democratic regime and 
in turn has important implications for its vision and institutional capacity to change civil 
society (Huntington, 1991, Diamond et al., 1990, Linz, 1990, O' Donnell et al., 1986).  
 
In the extensive literature on democratic transitions and consolidation, South Africa serves 
as the classic case study of pacted-transplacement.  Besides the global factors applicable to 
all Third Wave transitions, factors specific to South Africa produced the crisis of social 
control that forced the National Party elites to negotiate in the 1990’s with the 
representatives of the liberation movement. Saul and Gelb (1981) focus on the importance 
of what they refer to as the “organic crisis” of racial capitalism, highlighting the structural 
contradictions of the country’s racial capitalist system. The causes of this crisis and its 
manifestations include the changing labour requirements of an ascendant manufacturing 
capital and the political policies designed to produce unskilled black labour, the limitations 
of the domestic consumer market, the dependence on outside capital and the emphasis on 
capital goods in production, and finally, the contradictions of Bantu Education and influx 
                                            
21 Huntington (1991), a leading conservative advocate of this approach, identified a cyclical pattern of two 
previous waves, one of democratization (1828-1926; 1942-1962), followed by a reverse wave of democratic to 
authoritarian regimes (1922-1942; 1958-1975). The Third Wave begins in the Southern Cone of Europe and 
spreads to Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. The factors supposedly explaining this last 
wave include, issues related to problems of legitimacy, global economic growth, the ideological changes in 
Catholic Church Ideology, the end of the Cold War, and countries “copying” neighbours who had undergone 
democratic regime changes. 
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control for unfettered capitalist growth, particularly the constant complaint of a skills 
shortage. Besides these “economic” imperatives, importantly, Apartheid also suffered a 
crisis of rule. The regime reached a point in the 1970s when it was unable to establish and 
maintain social control and make compliance of everyday rules commonsense for black 
citizens possible on the terms of the state. This was both a cause and consequence of the 
student struggles on the campuses in the early 1970’s. 
 
The overthrow of colonial rule in the neighbouring states of Mozambique, Angola and 
Zimbabwe also had a profound symbolic effect on struggles in South Africa. Remarkably, 
black nationalist “Marxist-oriented” governments assumed power in these countries, 
changing the regional political map significantly, which allowed the ANC and PAC to 
operate closer to the South African border, receiving financial, ideological and military 
support from these governments. The South African military regularly invaded these 
countries bombing homes and assassinating suspected ANC activists and destroying the 
infrastructure.  In Angola and Mozambique, the Apartheid regime participated in a 
conventional war by supporting proxy military forces to overturn events in those countries.  
Although, these governments were not toppled, the years of destabilisation had a marked 
effect on their socio-economic development. This protracted conflict between South Africa 
and its neighbours prevented it from easily extending its consumer market into the 
Southern African region (Price, 1990). The integration of South Africa’s post-WW2 
economy in the global capitalist system made the successful campaigns demanding 
sanctions, disinvestments, and cultural and sports boycotts, all the more effective in 
mounting additional international pressure for regime change.  
 
The state crisis of social control produced divisions within the ruling elite between reform-
minded (“Verligte”) and conservative groups wanting to preserve old style Apartheid 
(“Verkrampte”). During the crisis the community organisations and state structures 
increasingly entered into negotiations to resolve local conflict situations. The Botha 
government opened informal talks with Nelson Mandela and a growing dialogue between 
regime elites, the opposition, and international observers became a regular news item, 
developing inevitably a new "democratic discourse." This discourse sat uneasily with the 
government and the ANC keeping alive "traditional" rhetoric, viewing the transition in 
"zero-sum" terms. 22 The release of Mandela and other long-term political prisoners set the 
tone for an intense period of high-level negotiations for a new democratic constitution, 
where each side attempted to protect what it saw as its fundamental interests. 
 
At the February 1990 opening of parliament the De Klerk government announced the 
release of Mandela from prison and the unbanning of liberation organisations, and called 
for free political activity with the intention of starting negotiations. The discussions first 
focussed on removing obstacles to negotiations, then on the structure of the negotiating 
forums and lastly, on the content of post-Apartheid South Africa. The negotiations 
proceeded along stages: First, the "talks about talks" stage, where the two sides met 
informally to establish “equal playing fields;” second, the formal negotiations identified with 
the negotiating forums, the Congress of a Democratic South Africa meetings (CODESA 1 
and 2) and lastly, the series of agreements outside CODESA focusing on specific issues, 
such as the violence between political organisations and state forces (Friedman and 
Atkinson, 1994).  
 
                                            
22 The government wanted the complete disavowal of communist, radical elements in the ANC. The ANC 
and the liberation movement continued to speak about a complete "seizure of power". 
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CODESA 2 broke down over the issue of a white veto and because the Apartheid 
government assumed a more intransigent, non-compromising position at the talks after 
comfortably winning an all-white referendum. In his parliamentary address, to the surprise 
of the ANC, the government called for a whites-only election to decide on any 
constitutional agreements arrived at CODESA, a position immediately rejected by the 
ANC. The government made new proposals at CODESA, wanting veto power for minority 
parties at the executive level and in the senate. The ANC embarked on rolling mass action, 
calling its followers to demonstrate against the government. At the same time the 
Goldstone Commission report implicated government and Inkatha in the brutal violence 
that was taking many lives on a daily basis. The massacre of people in the Boipotong 
township by Inkatha supporters, De Klerk having to flee the township because of angry 
residents, the shootings at Bisho where Ciskei Bantustan soldiers shot into a crowd of 
ANC-led demonstrators campaigning for the end of that regime, and most importantly, the 
fears unleashed by the assassination of Chris Hani, the leader of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), forced the government and the ANC back to the negotiating 
table.  
 
Through a series of meetings between Mandela and De Klerk at crucial moments to avert 
crises, the informal relationship between the ANC’s Cyril Ramaphosa and NP’s Roelf 
Meyer, and secret bosberaads bringing together the negotiating elites, the major crises 
around Boipotong, Bisho, and the Chris Hani assassination were overcome. A series of 
“mini” agreements (or pacts) were established through "sufficient consensus.”23  
 
Joe Slovo proposed a "sunset clause" which guaranteed the jobs of the civil service (mainly 
government supporting whites) after a change of regime.  Both sides agreed to an interim 
“power-sharing” government of five years and an elected constituent assembly to decide on 
the final constitution based on 34 agreed-upon principles. The strategy outmanoeuvred the 
"spoilers" whose first preferences were sidelined; the “moderates” in both camps 
dominated the proceedings. At the multiparty talks, the last stage of negotiations, the 
government and the ANC formerly agreed to a coalition government of all parties obtaining 
5% of the vote; a party-list proportional representative electoral system; two houses of 
parliament; a constitutional court; and an independent judiciary. This essentially amounted 
to a compromise, protecting the existing property relations yet incorporating the majority of 
South Africans into the political system.  
 
It is against this macro-political background (of transition by transplacement) that policy 
debates about higher education restructuring and reform have to be analysed (Badat, 1995; 
Sayed 2001). Additionally, as a result of global pressures specific to the 1990’s, the macro-
economic choices made by the new government delineated the parameters within which 
government “outputs” (state policies) were to be framed and implemented. It is to this 
macro-economic context (what we could perhaps describe as defensible “intervening 







                                            
23 Agreements between the dominant parties, the ANC and NP, were considered “sufficient consensus” and 
bound all other participating parties in situations when there was too much disagreement. This was an 
“informal” arrangement between the ANC and NP. 
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6. The Macro-Economic Debate: Framing Public Policy Output 
 
 
6.1. The Reconstruction and Development Programme: Watered Down Version 
of Struggle Values and Emergence of GEAR 
 
The type of transition experienced by South Africa, a transition by transplacement, together 
with the evolution (choices) of its macro-economic policy determine the parameters within 
which we can understand the relationship of higher education to social transformation. 
Since the 1960's the ANC espoused a left, welfare-oriented socialist ideology. In the first 
democratic elections the ANC proposed the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) as the core plank of its election manifesto. This was the ANC’s outline of how it 
aimed to overturn hundreds of years of state and civil society racism.   
 
The RDP document itself was the product of many years of debate in the ANC (Marais, 
1998, Lundahl, 1999). It sets out five broad goals: to meet basic needs, develop human 
resources, build the economy, democratise the state and society, and implement RDP 
projects. Six basic principles were to guide the attainment of the goals: integration and 
sustainability; a people-driven process; peace and security for all; nation building; linking 
reconstruction and development; and democratisation. These constitute noble yet abstract 
goals and like all state policy documents (including the higher education policy 
documentation), without detailed knowledge analysing the interpretation by various vested 
constituencies and implementation of policy, it is difficult to evaluate with any confidence. 
The path from original visions and intentions to actual and final government policy is 
arduous, replete with political battles, winners and losers; it is often just one stage of an 
ongoing battle. The RDP was no exception. From the moment the RDP was placed on the 
agenda (as the Base Document) a debate erupted among the various tendencies, ideologies, 
and factions within the ANC wanting to determine the organisations economic policy.  
 
The importance of the ANC position on these matters is indicated by the battles waged 
outside it to influence one or other position within the organisation: these came from South 
African business organisations, world financial organisations, Western governments, trade 
unions, foreign lending institutions, economists, consultants and the national and local 
media. Due to the importance of this issue and the strong attachments to the opposing 
positions within the ANC and its allied organizations, as well as to the ANC’s own view of 
itself in the South African transition, the organisation developed an economic policy that 
was as wide and all-embracing as possible. The RDP was a distilling of various discussions 
within the ANC, its allies, and its opponents.24  
 
Initially, the ANC’s Department of Economic Policy (DEP) (borrowing much from 
Cosatu’s Economic Trends Group) produced a blueprint for extensive state intervention, or 
what can be called “growth through redistribution”. The ideas were Keynesian where the 
state enacts policies to redistribute wealth, this spurs growth, and the rewards of this growth 
will meet the basic needs of poor people for houses, health, education and a better quality 
                                            
24 Disillusioned, the Left position within the ANC saw the RDP White Paper at the time as a watered down 
version of the original values of the history of the struggle and the organisation. The white paper represented a 
shift in ANC thinking, they argued, away from any "socialist" commitments. It speaks of "fiscal discipline", 
meaning reducing the benefits the state will provide to the poor and the working class. The emphasis is not on  
"redistribution" but on "growth" and redistribution; redistribution is mentioned only twice in the White Paper 
and given the same value as growth. There was no significant change in taxation, the Reserve Bank remains 
independent, the government pledges itself to the agreements of GATT, and lastly, the trade unions are not 
given any formal decision-making power in macro-economic policy (Adelzadeh, 1994). 
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of life. It advocated an active role for the state in planning industrial strategy and to respond 
to the legacies of Apartheid. It called for the restructuring of the financial sector to direct 
resources for infrastructural development, for foreign investment to be targeted to key areas 
of the economy, “inflationary financing” to meet the basic needs of the people (corporate 
tax, domestic savings). The unbundling of large corporations into small and medium-sized 
competitive enterprises would stimulate the economy and create jobs.  Low wages, the 
demand of business, was rejected and trade unions would have a direct role in developing 
policy. (Marais, 1998: 125).  
 
The ANC document caused shock and fear among South African business circles. It was 
socialist, they contended, and that it would lead to state overspending, capital flight and 
economic disaster. The ANC leadership cautiously distanced itself from the DEP document 
and withdrew it as a serious economic policy position within ANC structures. The business 
response was quick. It published a series of counter-proposals: the Old Mutual/Necor 
business group published the “Prospects for a Successful Transition”; the Sanlam Insurance 
group published the “Platform for Investment”, and the South African Chamber of 
Business, the “Economic Options for South Africa.” All of these similarly emphasised the 
market as the best distributor of goods and services and as the path towards overcoming 
Apartheid legacies. The South Africa Foundation, published a paper entitled “Growth for 
All” where it defended what it called a facilitating role for the state rather than one that 
regulates, an outward-looking economy requiring greater competitiveness, and “expert” 
knowledge of economics rather than popular conceptions. The Chamber of Business 
envisioned the role of the state to ensure social and political stability, to promote small 
business, reduce corporate tax, spend on infrastructure, reduce poverty and unemployment, 
and address the skills shortage. The World Bank sought capital investment in labour 
intensive sectors; the state's role was to provide incentives for investment and social 
support. The International Monetary Fund advocated classical structural adjustment: slash 
the budget deficit, lower inflation, achieve macro-economic stability, increase exports, 
liberalise the currency, and depend on foreign investment and access to foreign credit.  It 
warned against excessive government spending on education, health, training and 
infrastructure. The secret to attracting outside investments was to decrease real wages in the 
short term and increase productivity (Marais, 1998).  
 
The debate revolved around the state’s role in the economy. In the 1990’s the tide on such 
issues was on the side advocating a drastically reduced role for the state; this was in keeping 
with global trends. The emphasis was on the market rather than the state, towards 
privatising state assets, pleasing investors by reducing the strength of trade unions and 
reconfiguring the educational system to prepare young people for skills needed in the labour 
market.  
 
Around the middle of 1996, there was a sharp fall in the value of the South African rand (in 
relation to the US dollar). Also worrying, was the growing deficit in the balance of trade 
account (Ramos, 1997). Both indicators prompted the ANC government, largely without 
consultation within its organisation and political allies, to change macroeconomic policy and 
encourage direct foreign investment and the exports of South African goods. The Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) was announced (Lundahl, 1999). It 
outlined liberalising reforms to the South African economy, abandoned state and regulatory 
protection by opening up the South African economy to global markets, hoping that in the 
long term the economy would become globally competitive in selected niche sectors. It 
reduced or dropped tariffs protecting South African goods and allowed easier movement of 
goods and currency into and out of South Africa. It fixed (and reduced) government 
expenditure by setting the government budgetary deficit (normally over 5% of GDP) to 
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within 3% of GDP. To reduce inflation, the GEAR framework, seemingly encouraged (or 
rather did not discourage) the Reserve Bank to keep interest rates high thereby lowering 
higher consumer demand, price increases, and making the economy attractive to foreign 
investment and those who have savings. The wide-reaching, almost surprising, changes 
announced by the GEAR policy produced outcomes that are ambiguously inconclusive.  
 
The economy has grown, but not substantially enough to reduce the high unemployment or 
make a substantial dent to the backlogs inherited from Apartheid.  GEAR predicted that 
the economy would increase by 6% and create around 400 000 jobs per annum by the year 
2000. In 1996, the economy grew by 3.1%, in 1997 by 2%, and in 1998 the economy 
shrank. According to the Central Statistics Services (CSS) 71 000 jobs were lost in the 
formal sector (Osborn, 1997, Heintz, 1997), a phenomenon labelled "jobless growth.” The 
more open market has left the most vulnerable, the poor and working class without the 
technical skills that the intensely disputed “new” economy values; skills, supposedly easily 
transferable from one job to the next, given that the economy expects people to move 
regularly between jobs. GEAR desires that the South African labour market become more 
"flexible," labour more transferable, easily dismissed and re-hired. The result is increased 
labour productivity, a growing economy and citizens not better off than previously. James 
Heintz represents the view of many who remain unconvinced by the GEAR thesis (Heintz, 
1997). He suggests that increases in labour productivity do not necessarily translate into 
increases in growth and employment. Actually increases in productivity have led companies 
to reduce staff, purchase more capital-intensive machinery, and replace workers. 
 
Working within tighter budgetary constraints under GEAR, the government has not spent 
as much on social services as was anticipated from a “post-Apartheid dividend”. The result 
is the creation of a two-tier service system in health, education and social security, one 
private one public.  The private service sector provides relatively high quality products and 
services for those who can afford them; the public sector services to those without the 
choice and who remain dependent on the less-resourced state sector.25 For many the 
implementation of GEAR has increased unemployment, reduced, or not substantively 
increased the quality or access of education and health to the poor. Consequently, the racial 
and class inequalities of the past remain (Osborn and Heintz). More worrying is that the 
policy, its emphasis on the market as the valued distributor of goods and services, has left 
the historically privileged classes, the majority of whites and a rising black middle class as 
the main beneficiaries.   
 
The ANC governing group defends the GEAR policy. South Africa, it is argued, had few 
policy choices and GEAR was the only available policy to address the structural problems 
of the Apartheid economy; a problem inherited by the new government. The import-
substitution-industrialisation policy under Apartheid skewed the economy, favouring 
whites, led to protected industries, making South Africa less competitive in a globalised 
world economy. The GEAR program follows global trends and takes on the difficult task 
of restructuring the economy. The reduced tariffs will promote growth, increase the 
competitiveness of the economy, and in time companies will invest in labour because it is 
cheaper than capital-intensive investments and consequently the balance of payments 
situation will improve. One cannot blame the GEAR policy for the unemployment 
problem. This was one of the structural problems of the South African economy. GEAR, 
                                            
25 This private/public distinction in terms of the provision and quality of services does not apply to higher 
education where the established, state subsidized universities remain more attractive to those students who 
have the choice than the emerging private service providers.   
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by promoting investment will produce more jobs and it will provide better conditions for 
the implementation of the RDP (Ramos, 1997).  
 
 
7. Higher Education (HE) after Apartheid 
 
 
A roadmap of contemporary policies, debates, and practices in South African higher 
education (HE) will be referenced against that history of racialised oppression and the 
multitude of struggles to overcome it. The determined efforts to restructure HE in South 
Africa are best understood in relation to the type of transition from Apartheid, the 
macroeconomic framework set out by the ANC government and the nature of state-civil 
society relations.  Higher education institutions are located in the sphere of civil society and 
due to the nature of the transition were left in relatively strong positions in relation to the 
state to either help reproduce inherited social relations or to help change them, perhaps 
somewhat more slowly than the state and the majority of South Africans who participated 
in the struggle against Apartheid wished. 
 
The new government was not going to ignore the pressing issue of the turbulent higher 
education sector, that highly visible public space where old and new elites mingled, and 
besides, expresses enormous political and symbolic power in the overall social order. The 
HE debate in South Africa has been intense and emotive.  Due to the high regard a 
university education is given by impoverished communities who historically had very little 
access to higher education, and the role black students played in the anti-Apartheid struggle, 
both specialists and ordinary citizens have strong views on what is needed to change higher 
education institutions. The majority of South African citizens are concerned about student 
access, affordable education, the kinds of knowledge produced, curriculum design, 
standards, and the type of graduates exiting universities.  
 
Higher education policy is conceived as part of a larger government vision called the 
National Qualifications Framework. This is an idea to establish a certification framework, 
regulated by the state, by organising, arranging, and recognising educational qualifications 
from pre-primary to tertiary level into a single system of certification. (SAIRR 1996/97: 
216). This objective can be traced to the extensive report of the National Commission on 
Higher Education (NCHE) setting out proposals to reform the HE sector. The NCHE 
report was published in 1996. Its major recommendations informed the Green Paper on 
Higher Education (1996), the Draft White Paper on Higher Education (April 1997) and 
eventually the White Paper on Higher Education (July 1997) and the National Plan (2001). 
 
 
7.1. National Commission on Higher Education (1996) A Framework for 
Transformation 
 
In this section we discuss the NCHE document not only because it influenced the other 
documents that led to the legislation regulating higher education, but as a detailed and 
extensive study of higher education it serves as a useful introduction to the key issues, ideas 
and debates surrounding higher education in the democratic period. 
 
The NCHE was established in 1995 with the broad mandate to advise the Minister of 
Education on restructuring higher education to contribute towards reconstruction and 
development. The Commission of 12 appointed commissioners had a large research 
network organized around five task groups (supported by technical committees and 
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working groups) managed by an overall Framework and Coordinating Committee (See 
Appendix A). The Commission saw itself as producing policy that broke with a tradition of 
key policy texts going back to those produced under the previous regime (See Appendix 
B).26   
 
A central assumption informed the Commission’s approach: “that higher education can play 
a pivotal role in the political, economic and cultural reconstruction and development of 
South Africa.” (p.1) The roles of higher education in social transformation vary. At one end 
of this spectrum is the narrow conception reducing HE to the role of responding to the 
needs and demands of the economy.27 At the other, is the humanist emphasis expecting 
universities to empower individuals to assume the identities of active agents of a democratic 
society.  The Commission saw higher education functioning to variously: a) train a skilled 
labour force; b) develop a research infrastructure; c) contribute to community development; 
and d) contribute towards the “building of a new citizenry” (p. 24). Naturally, these goals 
were considered to complement each other even though they could prove to be 
contradictory. The universities and technikons were to be transformed so that they 
addressed inherited inequalities, inefficiencies, faced up to new socio-economic and cultural 
challenges including “the changing skill and knowledge requirements for improved 
productivity and innovation, and the needs associated with the building of a new citizenry” 
(p. 24).  
 
The Commission decided on the following principles to “guide and direct the process of 
transformation” (p. 4) 28. 
• Equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in higher education 
• Redress historical inequities 
• Democratic, representative and participatory governance (of the system and individual 
institutions)  
• Balancing the development of “material and human resources” 
• Quality in higher education services and products 
 
The NCHE proposals revolve around three areas: participation, responsiveness and 
governance. Participation deals with the problem of increasing access to higher education 
and changing it from an elitist to a ‘mass’ system,” a process referred to as “massification”. 
Bringing more poor and black students into universities and technikons requires diverse 
programmes, curricula and qualifications; “multiple entry and exit points”; changes in 
institutional functions and structures; and more funding. A single system will address 
inherited inequities, inefficiencies and be able to plan and “manage” increased access.  
 
                                            
26 Other documents not dealing specifically with HE, but which the Commission concluded was relevant to 
its subject matter included the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the White Paper on 
Reconstruction and Development, the White Paper on Education and Training, the Labour Relations Act, the 
White Paper on Science and Technology, the Report of the Labour Market Commission and the GEAR 
macroeconomic policy. 
27 The following quote from the commission report illustrates these opposing tendencies: “Only higher 
education can deliver the requisite research, the training of highly skilled personpower, and the creation of 
relevant, useful knowledge to equip a developing society with the capacity to participate competitively in a 
rapidly altering national and global context. 
28 These are listed on p. 20 in the discussion of the Goal-oriented funding. The CNHE sees the following as 
he basic principles of the higher education system: (1) equity; (2) redress; (3) development; (4) democracy; (5) 
efficiency; (6) effectiveness; (7) financial sustainability; and (8) shared costs. 
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 The idea of responsiveness refers to the need of higher education institutions to engage 
with problems in the broader society; “that of a developing and modernising African 
country in a period of transition from racial discrimination and oppression towards a 
democratic order with constitutional provisions for justice and equal opportunity” (p. 6). 
This engagement should be reflected in course content, pedagogy, and programmes. Lastly, 
the Commission called for partnerships - co-operative governance - to define relations 
between the state, higher education institutions and various “stakeholders.”  The state’s role 
is defined as a “steering and co-ordinating role.”29 Institutional autonomy is to be exercised 
within the limits of accountability. … The state will use financial incentives and other 
steering mechanisms as opposed to commanding measures of control and top-down 
prescriptions” (pp.7-8).  From these it derived specific proposals, expanding further its 
ideas in the three areas of a “single, co-ordinated higher education system, co-operative 
governance and goal-oriented funding”. Appendix C illustrates these specific proposals.  
 
The report provides a detailed analysis of skewed student enrolment trends. With state 
funding amounting to 1.7 % of GDP, South Africa was spending the same as the average 
budgeted for HE in OECD countries. However, the enrolment patterns in South Africa 
resembled an “inverted pyramid”. It contradicted the international pattern where 
universities have the lowest number of enrolments in higher education. In South Africa 
enrolments at universities exceed enrolments in the other tertiary education sectors. (See 
Appendix D for enrolment figures for 1995). 
 
The number of students entering higher education and the fields of study, degrees, 
throughput rates, staff composition, research outputs, and funding correlates to race and 
gender factors. Between 1993 and 1995 white student numbers dropped from 55% to 35% 
and black student numbers increased from 32% to 53%. Yet these figures do not reveal that 
despite increases in the total percentages “there was no major shift in the balance of 
participation rates of either the 18-21 or the 20-24 age cohorts. For white students the 
avenues of access to higher education were many times greater and easier in comparison to 
Coloured and African students.30 A further breakdown of access might possibly 
demonstrate that class is additionally an important factor and that race alone does not 
provide a comprehensive enough picture of student enrolment patterns.  
 
Among the academic staff, the Commission noted no major changes in the race and gender 
disparities of staff by 1995.  While whites made up 82% of the total academic staff in 1995, 
Africans accounted for a mere 11%. The under-qualification of staff generally but especially 
at black institutions remained a problem, compounding the institutional weaknesses and 
adding to the burdens faced by the historically black universities.31  The historically white 
universities granted many more postgraduate degrees than the black universities.  (See 
Appendix E). 
 
                                            
29 Sayed (2001) makes the point that the federal features of the political system, allowing provinces to 
implement national policy on a range of matters, has the effect of further reducing the capacity of the central 
state to change civil society. While provinces do not have control over higher education, the “idea” of federal 
and provincial powers in the political system, helps to bolster civil society institutions in relation to the central 
state at least ideologically.  
30 Recent studies have shown that the “massification” of education has not taken place. After student 
numbers increased between 1993 and 1997, universities registered a sharp drop between 1998 and 1999. More 
worrying is that enrolments at the historically black universities declined by 13000 or 14% from 1995 to 1999. 
31 The white universities receive more state funds than the black universities. The report identified the state 
allocation of funds as an important instrument if it wanted a more representative higher education sector. See 
Sayed and Jansen, 2001.   
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The NCHE was a massive endeavour. Moja and Hayward (2001) recognise its contribution 
as having initiated a discussion on higher education by providing a common starting point, 
establishing an admirable example of transparency, consultation and democratic 
participation during the process of developing the final report, and despite the ideologically 
varied composition of the commission, the final report represented a progressive approach 
to overcoming the inequalities of the past. Despite these positive remarks, the commission 
and the final report was still criticized for not identifying “a coherent philosophy of 
education” such as the Africanisation of higher education, for marginalizing and silencing 
the views of some stakeholders, for not developing any proposals on curriculum 




7.2. Higher Education White Paper (1997) and Related Policy Developments 
 
In December 1996, a Green Paper on Higher Education, condensed to six chapters, was 
released. It endorsed most of the recommendations of the NCHE report, differing on the 
issue of governance. Instead of the two statutory bodies (the Higher Education Forum and 
Higher Education Council), the Green Paper proposed a single body called the Council on 
Higher Education to regulate among other things, for advising the Minister of Education 
on all policy matters and for quality assurance.  
 
The Education White Paper 3, now summarised into 4 chapters, was released in July 1997. 
It built on the Green paper and the influence of the NCHE report comes through. It 
acknowledges several goals of higher education and suggests, (ironically just when the RDP 
was about to be replaced), that HE should “contribute to and support the process of 
societal transformation outlined in the RDP, with its compelling vision of people-driven 
development leading to the building of a better quality of life for all.” At the same time a 
competitive market oriented theme associated with the demands of globalisation permeated 
some goals (p. 3).  It identified the following goals for HE 1) to meet individual learning 
needs; 2) to meet the development needs of society and to provide a skilled workforce for a 
“knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society”; 3) “To contribute to the 
socialisation of enlightened, responsible and constructively critical citizens.” It recognises 
research as also an end in itself emphasising “intellectual inquiry through research, learning 
and teaching.”  
 
The Higher Education White Paper (1997) aimed to restructure higher education into a 
single, national coordinated system. The text locates the transformation of higher education 
in the broader “political, social and economic transition,” which is constrained by 
globalisation:  
“(Transition) includes political democratisation, economic reconstruction and 
development, and redistributive social policies aimed at equity. This national agenda 
is being pursued within a distinctive set of pressures and demands characteristic of 
the late twentieth century, often typified as globalisation. The term refers to 
multiple, inter-related changes in social, cultural and economic relations, linked to 
the widespread impact of the information and communications revolution, the 
growth of trans-national scholarly and scientific networks, the accelerating 
integration of the world economy and intense competition among nations for 
markets. … These economic and technological changes will necessarily have an 
impact on the national agenda given the interlocking nature of global economic 
relations. ” (p. 4-5) 
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It expects of higher education to provide the training, skills, innovations, and knowledge so 
that the South African economy can integrate and interact with the dominant global 
economy on a competitive footing. Higher education must be “internally restructured to 
face the challenge of globalisation, in particular, the breaking down of national and 
institutional boundaries which removes the spatial and geographic barriers to access” (p. 5). 
It also expects higher education to contribute towards reconstructing the society more 
equitably. The principles and goals32 further reveal the competing discourses (globalisation, 
empowering the people, economic needs; democracy) that coexist in the text in an 
uncomfortable tension. It mentions the following:  
a) Increase equity of access and “fair chance of success” while at the same time 
“eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress for past 
inequalities.” 
b) Teaching, learning and research to meet “national development needs” including 
employment skills training for industry.  
c) “Support a democratic ethos and a culture of human rights by educational programmes 
and practices conducive to critical discourse and creative thinking, cultural tolerance, 
and a common commitment to a humane, non-racist and non-sexist social order.” 
d) Support all forms of knowledge/scholarship and address problems/demands of “the 
local, national, southern African and African contexts, and uphold rigorous standards of 
academic quality.” 
 
Based on these different and perhaps opposing challenges, the White Paper reiterates the 
NCHE report and the Higher Education Green Paper, emphasising the importance of 
increased and broadened participation, responsiveness to societal interests and needs,33 and 
cooperative partnerships of governance. On the latter it called for a rethinking of relations 
between higher education institutions and the state, civil society, and stakeholders.34 
 
In 2001 the Department of Education released an important document called the National 
Plan on Higher Education (See Appendix F), which outlines the practical steps that the 
state would take in changing the higher education sector in accordance with the aims set out 
in the White Paper. The CHE also presented guidelines on how quality in the provision of 
higher education will be regulated. Lastly a new formula to distribute public funds to higher 
education institutions has been proposed. The funding is defined as a goal-directed funding 
                                            
32 The section on goals lists 12 national (system level) goals including the contribution and role of research 
towards technological and social development; developing “social responsibility and awareness amongst 
students of the role of higher education in social and economic development through community service 
programmes”; producing skilled graduates who are competent in critical, analytical and communication skills 
to deal with change, diversity and tolerance to opposing views; and developing capacity for a more 
representative staff. It also lists 6 institutional level goals which include democratizing governance; 
encouraging partnerships with wider society; developing programmes that are responsive to social, political, 
economic and cultural needs; establishing academic climates that support “free and open debate, critical 
questioning of prevailing orthodoxies and experimentation with new ideas”; demonstrating social 
responsibility by “making available expertise and infrastructure for community service programmes;” and 
building cultures based on tolerance and respect. This idea of contributing towards social transformation 
through community service programmes is mentioned at least twice but not followed through in terms of 
structures and processes, rather it is left to institutions to decide when, if and how to do this. 
33 Here it refers to restructuring institutions to deal with the technologically oriented economy by “delivering” 
the necessary research, highly trained people and knowledge “to equip a developing society with the capacity 
to address national needs and to participate in a rapidly changing and competitive global market.” (p. 6)  
34 In practice this was likely to involve greater access of private business to university research activity, rather 
than relations between higher education institutions and poor communities, unless explicitly encouraged 
financially by the state and additionally great effort is made to change the ideological culture within 
universities. 
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system linking public funds to institutional demonstration of movement towards the goals 
established in the White Paper and National Plan.  
  
 
8. Higher Education and Social Transformation in South Africa: Concluding 
Remarks 
 
In this study we emphasise the collapse of the Apartheid state as the central demarcation 
point between two different political terrains. Each constitutes fundamentally different 
relations between the state and civil society in South Africa, and consequently the roles of 
higher education institutions in the two periods are different.  In the pre-1994 period higher 
education institutions played an important indirect role in bringing down the Apartheid 
state by creating the conditions for student social protest. In the post-1994 period much has 
been achieved by the democratic government on the legislative policy front to transform 
higher education institutions and to make them more socially responsive and critically 
engaged in deepening and broadening South Africa’s democracy. However, implementing 
these policies has proven to be a slow, arduous and ambiguous process; impressive gains sit 
alongside old patterns reproducing themselves both within the higher education sector and 
in the relations between this sector and society.  
 
In our discussion of the pre-1994 period, we drew attention to the combination of 
structural, conjunctural and subjective factors that in the mid-1980’s produced conditions 
whereby everyday rules governing social relations – economic, political, social and cultural – 
became contestable, challenged from various quarters, and were infused with different, 
alternative values to that desired by the dominant order. This situation compelled the ruling 
party to negotiate a political settlement with the opposition movement.  The role of black 
students as a social force for change, together with important strategic allies within and 
outside higher education, constituted an important segment of the subjective factors - the 
resistance of anti-Apartheid forces - to bring about the collapse of the Apartheid regime.  
 
In the post-1994 period the terrain of the agenda for transformation in South Africa is the 
site of many contestations. In the main, it can be argued that it mostly reflects the values 
and goals repeatedly conveyed during the freedom struggle: to overcome the legacies of 
racism and exploitation. Yet the content of these are variously debated. Gradually though a 
minimal consensus shows signs of emerging to address the material “backlog”, the material 
and psychological poverty suffered by the majority of citizens which disadvantages them in 
exercising the rights enshrined in the new constitution and accessing the resources available 
in society. The determined policy changes advocated by the new government in the post 
1994 period are a matter of only a few years. Any assessment of the “impact” of higher 
education on social transformation in this short period is bound to be limited and tentative. 
In the following section we discuss the impact of higher education on the economic, 
political, social and cultural aspects of society and identify some of the key issues and 
themes raised in the contemporary discussion on higher education.  
 
The macro-economic policy embraced by the democratic government and the model of 
post-Apartheid development has enormous implications for the role of higher education in 
society. With the GEAR policy pursued by the government the tendency has been to 
emphasise two themes: The first is that the university should become more 
“entrepreneurial” in its own organization, outlook, research and curriculum content. The 
second is that the predominant mandate of the university should be to produce the person-
power and knowledge that would make South Africa globally competitive by helping it re-
configure itself into a “knowledge economy.”  Students are encouraged to take degrees in 
 40
the natural sciences and commerce, rather than the arts and the humanities. Critics of the 
GEAR policy challenge these themes. Instead they emphasise other ‘non-economic” values 
of post-Apartheid development, importantly the role of universities in contributing towards 
the promotion of critical and active citizens in public affairs.  
 
An increased role for universities in producing the right kind of graduate holds a certain 
appeal for governing elites and university managers. Since World War 2, South African 
business interests have complained about the severe shortage of skilled labour especially at 
the higher ends of the labour market. There are too few trained managers, engineers, 
accountants and other professionals in South Africa. This increasing demand, argued the 
business sector, could only be addressed by attracting foreign trained persons or influencing 
higher education institutions in South Africa to produce graduates in those fields demanded 
by the labour market. This view also has the support of key sectors within the trade union 
movement.  
 
Initially, the received view merely wanted to increase the numbers of students at higher 
education institutions and to encourage them into the Science, Education and Technology 
(SET) fields.  This move entailed a narrowly conceived view of fulfilling both the 
“participation” and “responsiveness” functions set out in the post-1994 legislation. While 
entrance and access remain important concerns, the content of “knowledge” and its 
usefulness to the “new knowledge” economy has also assumed increasing stature. Two 
assumptions guide thinking and discussion within this viewpoint. The first relies on the 
view that “globalisation”, freight-train like, imposes a different kind of capitalist economy 
on all in its path and that the South African economy is becoming or should become a 
“new economy” requiring new kinds of labour skills. Consequently, and this is the second 
point, universities should change and reconfigure themselves to produce the type of 
graduates the economy requires and help make the South African economy more 
competitive in this new globalisation era.  
 
The NCHE expected student enrolment to increase from 17% of the population to 30% by 
2005 based on the prediction that school-leavers would increase by 10% per year and 
university enrolments would increase by 4% per year thereafter. In 1998 enrolments 
reached 608 000 students, decreased in 1999 and then settled around 600 000 students in 
2000. Student enrolments at all universities actually declined from 1997 onwards and 
surprisingly, the former Afrikaans language universities and distance education providers 
attracted the most number of black students. A mixed bag of factors have been proposed to 
account for the decline in student enrolment: the increase in unemployment, the stringent 
admissions policies of universities35, the limited number of courses offered at universities, 
the poor recruitment and outreach practices of the universities, the low high school 
matriculation pass rates 36, the growth of private education institutions, the declining 
growth of the population 37, and the death toll caused by HIV/AIDS among the youth. 
The rate of graduates successfully completing their studies remains low. Those who do 
                                            
35 Just to draw on one example from the UCT admissions policy. Here the matric symbols are rated on a 
point scale of 1 to 8 with an A symbol equivalent to an 8. However, the English score is doubled, 
disadvantaging second language English speakers, all of which will invariably be black students.  
36 The decreased population figure expresses itself in lower numbers than expected enrolling for primary and 
secondary education. Also lower than expected numbers are taking the school-leaving certificate exam, and a 
smaller percentage qualify with exemption allowing them to enter the universities 
37 The report relied on unverified population data especially for the Bantustans where population numbers 
were never systematically recorded, and the Commission chose to rely on higher estimates. 
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graduate tend to join the “skills drain” by searching for employment in the UK, US, Canada 
and Australia.  
 
Some who adopt a rigid, unidirectional causal relationship between higher education and 
the labour market, as do Bunting and Cloete (2000), assume that university graduates will be 
employed by a “colour-blind” labour market and the inherited racially skewed occupational 
structure will change as a consequence. This is not necessarily the case.  A culture and 
history of racism remains pervasive in South African society and this directly affects labour 
market employment practices.38 Additionally, to assume that South Africa will easily slip 
into a “knowledge economy” remains problematic.39  The South African economy is highly 
differentiated – low skilled, under-resourced sectors rooted in migratory labour practices, a 
developing “ISI” secondary industrialization sector, a long-standing monopoly agricultural 
sector, a “peasant” subsistence sector as well as all those “knowledge” sectors dependent 
upon micro-chip technologies we associate with advanced capitalist economies. Any role 
that higher education will play in producing graduates for the labour market will have to 
work with a much more differentiated notion of the South African economy and the racially 
influenced hiring practices of the labour market.  
 
The typical contribution of higher education to the political system lies in the creation of 
elites. These tend to dominant the sphere of politics, to contribute towards the creation and 
reproduction of the dominant ideology, and to serve as a source of “knowledge” from 
which good public policy positions can draw. There are many links between universities and 
the polity in post-1994 South Africa -formal and informal, direct and indirect. Higher 
education institutions have in the post-1994 produced significant numbers of graduates who 
took up positions in the public sector.  Some universities, such as the University of the 
Western Cape, lost many of its senior academic staff to the public sector. Without this input 
the success of the transition, the bases for democratic consolidation and the quality of 
governance would have been less secure. The role of HE institutions in policy-making and 
evaluation has also increased dramatically since 1994 with many academics doing 
consultancy work in state related policy output. Higher education institutions provide a 
                                            
38 Two contradictory trends were registered in the South African labor market. Between 1970 and 1995 high 
skilled, graduate students were in demand; the lower the level of qualification and skills the less the demand. 
The growth in the total number of jobs was 17.6%, but the massive demand approached over 2000%. School-
leaving jobs rose by 350%, for those students with some high school qualification by 53%, and those with only 
primary school education and below showed negative growth rates; the economy had no jobs for them 
(Bhorat, 1999:7). After 1995 these trends change. Surprisingly the demand for degreed workers fell, while the 
largest increase was for those with a school-leaving certificate and even for those with primary education. The 
demand for the latter rose some 421%. More astonishing is that employment for black students with degrees 
actually declined by 11.84%. Employment for Coloured students with degrees increased only slightly by 3.1%, 
but those for Asian and White students increased by 15.1% and 10.5% respectively. The conclusion that the 
labor market is “color-blind” does not apply yet in South Africa. 
39 The National Plan of Education (2002) calls for reducing the numbers of students taking Humanities 
courses from 49% to 40% and that numbers in Commerce and the Natural Sciences should each increase by 
30%. The case of Brazil, a “most similar case” comparative design for South Africa, is instructive here. 
Schwartzman (2002) argues that the “general skills” of a broad Humanities degree be preserved, because in 
“dependent” economies like Brazil there will always be limited jobs in the technical and science fields; it will be 
the service sector where job growth will take place and this sector requires jobseekers with general skills. The 
argument convincingly applies to South Africa. However, we can only speculate on the size of the service 
sector. The majority of people operate in what is called the “informal” economy where economic relations and 
activity overlap with cultural and social networks opening up different political discourses as poor people 
engage in what Migdal (1988) once referred to as “strategies of survival”. Consequently analysis relying on data 
applicable to South Africa’s formal economy will have limited validity and should not be “conceptually 
stretched” to generalize for the entire society. 
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social and cultural space for both academic and political elites to meet and establish 
relationships. In a country like South Africa with its new political system and a legacy of 
deep division the importance of fora for communication, bringing people from diverse 
backgrounds together, is vitally important for the consolidation of its democratic 
dispensation.  
 
At the same time the relationship between universities and the state is not an easy one. 
There exists a growing gap between the expectations of the state and the role some 
universities see themselves playing in relation to the political system. The Centre for Higher 
Education Transformation (CHET), which identifies its main role as “evaluating 
transformation processes” in higher education, used 12 indicators to evaluate changes 
between 1995 and 2000 at the University of Port Elizabeth and Peninsula Technikon. (See 
Appendix G). A quick glance at the indicators suggests the difficulties facing evaluation on 
those items that are not easily “measurable” in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, given the 
many conceptual limitations associated with such efforts, the CHET evaluation concludes 
that access of black students has increased significantly, but enrolment in the designated 
SET fields, enrolment at postgraduate level, and graduation success has not changed 
significantly. In terms of staff, responsiveness and governance more needs to be done, 
although both institutions have made some progress in these areas.  
 
More work obviously remains to be done at the micro, institutional level as the policy 
changes developed by government take root, placing analysts in a better position to provide 
evaluations of higher education policy in terms of its implementation and outcomes over 
time, and these can then be related to the policy content.  Only with a substantial body of 
such institutional case study material can more conclusive statements be made about 
transformation at the level of institutions with any confidence.  
 
Yet few observers will be unimpressed with the extent, quality and abundance of material 
developed in the higher education policy making front in the short decade after the collapse 
of Apartheid. This can only constitute a remarkable point of departure. The stage is 
certainly set for implementation, and the state with the same enthusiasm with which it 
produced the formative policy documents appears to be approaching the challenge of 
getting higher education institutions to work within the proposed policy frameworks at the 
same time as being mindful of issues related to institutional autonomy. Yet as will be 
expected, the relations between the state and universities on this fundamental matter of 
changing well established social relations will be tested as each side promotes or protects its 
own interests. 
 
We can conclude that in focusing on the relationship between higher education and social 
transformation, that South African Universities, like universities everywhere, tend to assume 
multiple roles, serving varied constituencies, constituting and responding to the social 
conflict within their walls in different ways and responding differently to the established 
social patterns found in society. We have suggested that in looking at the roles of 
universities in the fall of Apartheid and in the social transformation of post Apartheid 
society, that it is inaccurate to view higher education institutions as homogenous entities. 
Brennan et al (2002) recognise this when they urge that it is important to “acknowledge that 
universities play multiple roles, both reproductive and transformative. Within individual 
institutions, even within individual academic departments, roles played may be multiple and 
contradictory.”   
 
Both reproductive and transformative tendencies can be identified in varying degrees at 
higher education institutions in South Africa.  Besides “imparting knowledge,” reproducing 
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old elites and creating new ones, all universities in South Africa shared a common 
“reproductive function” in that they were formed and designed to address and serve the 
needs of particular racial-ethnic sections of the population; in this sense they endorsed and 
reproduced the prevailing social relations under Apartheid. They obviously did so 
differently but they did contribute in significant ways to the reproduction of the whole racial 
social order. Certainly, pockets of resistance were always present within universities – 
among progressive departments, but mostly among individual academics. At the historically 
disadvantaged institutions the conditions prevailing in the 1960’s promoted the growth of 
student politicisation.  By the 1970’s, and earlier in the case of Fort Hare, black universities 
were without intending to do so, creating the space for young students to voice and act on 
their political frustrations. These institutions were gradually transformed into terrains of 
political struggle by student organisations and campaigns.  The resistance was not uniform. 
Periods of relative calm and stability were followed by a breakdown of normal classes when 
student protest was embarked upon.   
 
 In accessing their various roles in social transformation in South Africa, the space the 
historically black universities created for political resistance contributed to the collapse of 
Apartheid by becoming key centres of the civic uprisings during the 1980’s. At the same 
time the mainstream of the historically white universities played intensely conservative, even 
reactionary roles. Black higher education institutions, by the nature of the repressive design 
envisioned by Apartheid planners, created conditions conducive to politicise black students. 
In turn, these institutions themselves became differently constituted contradicting the 
original designs of the state. While functionally the role of universities under Apartheid 
South Africa were intended by the state and the university elites to be 
reproductive/socialising of existing relations of power, some of them became important 
sites of resistance. The differences in history, culture, institutional configuration, staff 
composition, physical structure, and university and student leadership, all combined in 
different and various ways, to produce different forms of resistance.  
 
The historically white institutions played the key role in creating the large white middle 
class, a role assigned higher education institutions during the colonial and Apartheid 
periods; this class supported Apartheid, until in the mid-1980’s emerging divisions within 
the Afrikaner political elites largely expressed the growing frustration among this group. 
The black institutions also directly increased the size of the black middle class with the 
formation of the ethnic colleges. This emerging black middle class of the 1960’s due to 
conditions of study, apartheid legislation, and the racist ideology of the society found their 
expectations frustrated and played a crucial role in regenerating an internal resistance 
movement that reached significant proportions in the 1980’s.  
 
The growing trend of the black middle class has continued in the post-1994 period with 
many more opportunities for upward social mobility. Graduates from both black and white 
universities have taken jobs in the state, private sector and civil society. They have moved 
into former white neighbourhoods, their children in the main attending former white 
schools, and participating in civil society structures formerly reserved for whites. In this 
middle class sense, some public spaces in South Africa have become deracialised and 
universities in the creation of the emerging black elite, can be held indirectly responsible for 
this social impact.  
 
By helping to produce the new elite, higher education institutions indirectly contribute to 
the economy and a lifestyle that can have transformative implications. The growth of the 
South African economy from the decade long period of recession and political turmoil of 
the 1980s can be attributed in large measure to having the people to take up high level 
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skilled employment. No doubt, the problem of the “skills shortage” continues, but from the 
political perspective, the transition may not have reached a point of institutional stability, 
had the economy not grown at all. Indirectly, the increase in the purchasing power of the 
new black middle class has directly helped the economy grow. The quality of life of the new 
middle class empowers this class. Given the degree of a civic socially responsible ideology 
encouraged by the state and embraced by this class, it is positioned to put resources, skills, 
time and ideas back into the impoverished communities from which many have come. 
More explicitly at the political level transition theorists have long established that without a 
significant middle class societies undergoing democratic transition are less likely to 
consolidate their democratic institutions (Linz and Stepan, 1996, Lijphart, 1990, Diamond 
et al., 1990). South Africa’s black middle class may not be big enough, but it has been able 
to give the new institutions a great deal of legitimacy. Linz (Linz and Stepan, 1978, Linz, 
1990) argues that a test for democratic consolidation is when given a serious crisis key elites 
will choose to abandon the democratic institutions of their society. This seems quite 
unlikely in the South African case, demonstrating the importance, legitimacy, and value that 
both the middle and working classes bestow upon the hard won democratic institutions of 
the society.  
 
It can be argued that the culture of democracy, of values of tolerance and the respect for 
citizens’ rights have slowly taken root in South Africa. Universities, which were once 
directly active participants in the racist, Apartheid project, have contributed to a new 
democratic culture. Many of these new democratic practices can be traced to the student 
resistance of the 1980’s, more firmly located within the historically black universities, but 
also influencing practices in the historically white universities, as students and academics 
moved from the former to the latter institutions. The many forums, seminars and lectures 
by prominent speakers, most identifying closely with a democratic ethos, helps spread such 
values and consolidates them beyond university settings. This is not to deny that 
undemocratic values still pervade the society, but the democratic trend appears to be 
dominant. The media, still controlled by well-established white elites and which have 
adopted a critical stance towards the new government, have nevertheless also experienced 
internal changes. Many of the new journalists received their education at South African 
higher education institutions and are products of the 1980’s student revolts. In their new 
role in a powerful site of ideological production, they contribute towards spreading 
information, democratic values, and critical analyses enhancing South African democracy. 
 
However, racist practices in South Africa still continue in a multitude of forms, affecting all 
classes of blacks. Those among the poor and the working class daily bear the brunt of such 
abuse. Many from these groups find it difficult to get into higher education institutions 
because they are unable to afford the fees. The states funding proposals and student aid 
scheme will in time assist these students, but in sociological terms, as a class, access to 
universities and movement into the middle classes will remain remote. The students from 
poor and working class backgrounds in the 1990’s did enter universities in significant 
numbers. However, soon the historically black universities complained that they had to 
increase fees and monitor fee payment more systematically than previously because they did 
not receive any additional funding from the state.  Students responded by participating in 
regular protest action in defence of their interests. At universities like the University of the 
Western Cape, regular boycotts took place in the 1990’s with students protesting against the 
university excluding students at the beginning of each year for non-fee payment. The fees 
struggle also brought to the attention of students other issues, such as the continued poor 
quality of student resources at the historically black universities in comparison to the 
historically white universities, failure to change the curriculum sufficiently to move beyond 
Eurocentric paradigms, the demand for alternative forums of democratic governance at 
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these institutions and a host of other alternative ideas constituting post-Apartheid 
institutions.  
 
Unfortunately, by the late 1990’s the student movement showed signs of growing weakness 
as fewer students actively participated in student organisations and student collective action.  
Issues that have animated students in other parts of the world  – privatisation, anti-
globalisation, environmental issues, identity politics, public space and HIV/AIDS treatment 
struggles – have not as yet developed into a serious agenda for the South African student 
movement, although there are signs that these may take centre ground in the years ahead. 
The issue revolves around a broader absence of a vibrant civil society movement in South 
Africa, post 1994. Many student activists once firmly located within the anti-Apartheid 
struggle, many fighting within the fold of the ANC, now face the ANC as government. 
They and other progressive social forces are in the process of deciphering new ways of 
expressing their differences towards government policies and practices. The transition in 
social activism has been cautious given that the ANC is still fighting entrenched racist 
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APPENDIX A: Focus of NCHE Research Teams 
 
Task Groups Technical Committees 
1 - Current Situation  
2 - Future Needs and 
Priorities 
 
3 – Governance a) National system 
b) Institutional governance 
4 – Finance a) Student financial aid 
b) System (institutions) 








5 – Programme, 
Institutional and 
Qualification Framework 
a) Student and staff access, 
support and 
development 
b) National Qualifications 
framework 
c) Size, shape and 
functions 







APPENDIX B: Key Higher Education Policy Documents 
 
Date Text 
1953 Bantu Education Act  
1959 Extension of University Education Act (establishes racially based 
universities) 
1974 Van Wyk de Vries Commission* 
1978* Goode Committee* 
1993 Technikons Act 9 allowing techikons to grant degrees 
1995 SAQA Act (established SAQA) 
Feb 1996 A National Qualifications Framework discussion document published 
entitled “Lifelong Learning through a National Qualifications 
Framework.” Offers an outcomes-based model of education and 
training based on “programmes” designed to achieve certain 
outcomes. It recommends an eight-level framework with different 
“bands” corresponding to primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
June 1996 SAQA appoints (26 members) to oversee the development of the 
NQF and publishes the “NQF working document” 
July 1996 NCHE Report. A Framework for Transformation 
1996 Green Paper on Higher Education 
April 1997 Draft White Paper on Higher Education 
July 1997 Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of 
Higher Education 
1997 Higher Education Act 
March 2001** Education ministry releases the “National plan for Higher Education” 
doc 
2001** Education ministry releases the “Funding of Public Higher 
Education: a New Framework” doc 
May 2001** HEQC of the CHE is formally launched 
2002 Release of the Report of the National Working Group (NWG) 
Source: (NCHE, 1996) 
* Both these distinguished between the university, technikon and college on the basis of 
“function” (p. 30) 
** These three are seen to be the major steering mechanisms for directing higher education 
change 
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1. Proposals for a single, 
co-ordinated higher 
education system  
 
1. Provide for increased access. Suggests following a 
“multipronged strategy” (p11) to increase participation rates 
to 30% by 2005, involving (a) 3-yr rolling plans to coordinate 
enrolments by levels and learning areas; (b) plans to match 
HE outputs with national and regional needs; (c) encourage 
private higher education; (d) expand the further education 
sector; (e) increase distance education and resource-based 
learning; and (f) restructure the college sector and improve 
regional co-ordination to share resources.* 
 
2. Proposes that HE be “planned, governed and funded as a 
single, co-ordinated system” with universities, technikons, colleges 
and private higher education. Prefers fewer, larger 
multidisciplinary institutions. The proposed Higher Education 
Council (HEC) should manage this process through mergers, 
creating diverse types of institutions. All higher education 
programmes be offered as part of a “single qualifications 
framework.” This requires an effective regulatory environment, a 
new qualifications framework, a Quality Assurance system, new 
research funding, planning, infrastructure, a national plan by the 
HEC, institutional policy and progress with regard to race and 
gender equity, and submitting annual reports.**  
 
3. Incorporate colleges of education, nursing and agriculture into 
universities and technikons and develop a further education 
sector. 
 
4. Increase distance education (report prefers a single distance 
education institution) 
 
5. Introduce “rolling” three-year national higher education plans. 
Draft plans to be discussed with the HEC. Criteria for approving 
plans include institutional capacity, regional/national needs, race 
and gender equity goals, resource sharing and collaboration and to 
funding of student places. Institutional redress funding for 
“resources, capacity and infrastructure.” 
 
6. Include higher education programmes in the National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF). Supports a programme-based 
approach to higher education; develop a new quality assurance 
system under SAQA; proposes the HEQC to deal with quality in 
higher education and to fall under the HEC. Views the HEQC, 
together with SERTEC (The Certification Council for Technikon 
Education) as carrying the HEC’s “statutory authority for 
accreditation of higher education programmes.” (p. 12) New 
formula funds must provide for Academic Development while 
earmarked funding to used to develop programmes. 
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7. Emphasise research and contribution to National System of 
Innovation 
 
8. Identify key areas of capacity development (e.g. in research and 
postgraduate studies; focus on “basic science and disciplinary 
research”; use more incentive funding; expand access to post 
graduate study; support flexible entry/exit points. Supports 
incentive funding for research outputs, research set-up costs 
especially at post graduate level, allocate resources to fund 
research projects, expand the institutional base for research; 
improve student selection methods; fund bridging programmes; 
support capacity building initiatives  
 
9. Establish a National Higher Education Information and 
Admissions Service to streamline applications selection 
procedures by institution; provide information on programmes, 
financial aid, etc. 
 
 




Create a branch of higher education in the Department of 
Education to advise minister on policy matters. Also proposes t 
two statutory bodies be formed as intermediaries between HE and 
the state – a Higher Education Forum (HEF) and a Higher 
Education Council (HEC). 
 
Regional Level: 
HEC should encourage regional structures to be “consulted on 
the planning needs of the region, mergers, rationalization, 
programme distribution, sharing of resources and the 
development of institutional capacity.”  
 
Institutional level: 
Need policies and mechanisms to address RCG issues: access 
(changing the student and staff profiles), development (capacity 
and training), curriculum transformation, and institutional culture 
(enabling and safe environment). Suggest restructuring of councils, 
senates and academic boards, and establishing Institutional 
Forums to focus broadly on institutional transformation (for this 
need student bodies to be organized, SRC helped to develop 
leadership capacity). Also suggest establishing Workplace Forums 
as specified in the Labour Relations Act. Students need to 
participate in decisions about student support services (p19) – 
therefore propose the Student Services Councils be set up in 
institutions to advise on policy. 
 
The NCHE recommends new legislation (a Higher Education 
Act) to specify national and institutional relationships, identify key 
governance structures, describe functions and powers of the HEC 





funding of higher 
education 
Propose a “goal-oriented” funding framework for public higher 
education. This would have two elements:  
(1) Formula funding component – will generate block grants for 
institutions based on FTEs, and levels and fields of study. 
(2) Earmarked funding component – will be allocated in line with 
specific policy, and for targeted programmes and activities, 
address “unacceptable inequalities and to serve as a means of 
redress in higher education.” (p.21) The NCHE suggests the 
following areas for earmarked funding: research, student financial 
aid, academic development, staff development, information 
technology, library capacity building, curriculum development, 
equipment, institutional development, new buildings and new 
land. It states that earmarked funds should be allocated according 
for three types of redress: (a) institutional redress (to 
disadvantaged institutions; need to apply; allocated on the basis of 
“comprehensive institutional audits and institutional missions, 
programme mixes and needs assessments); (b) individual redress 
(in the form of student financial aid schemes such as NSFAS; and 
(c) other specific purposes. The NCHE makes a further sub-
division into categorical funds, initiative funds, and incentive 
funds. 
Source: (NCHE, 1996: 8-23) 
* The report (p. 11) states this kind of “multipronged strategy” should: 
• Increase the higher education participation rate to about 30% (“as a percentage of 
the 20 to 24-year old cohort”) by 2005 
• This rate will increase to 1 500 000 students in 2005 (from about 800 000 students in 
1995)  
* Supports government steering “in line with broad national goals … /… by means of 
incentives and evaluation of institutions and programmes rather than by detailed regulation 
and legislation.” 
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APPENDIX D: Total Headcount Enrolments in Education (1995) 
 
Sector Total Headcounts % of sector % of Headcount 
A. Schools subtotal (private 
public, special) 
12 278 100 100% 91.5%
B. Further Education 
subtotal (technical colleges; 
private colleges for 
secondary education) 
274 735 100% 2.0%
C. Higher Education 
Agricultural colleges 
Technical colleges (N4-N6) 
Private colleges 
Colleges of education 






























All Education 13 422 445 ------ 100%
Source: Adapted from NCHE (1996: 31) 
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APPENDIX E: Outputs of Postgraduates by Universities (1986 and 1993) 
 
 HBU contact HWU contact 
 1986 1993  1986 1993  
Honours 300 636 3 495 4 755 
Masters 89 161 2 215 2 970 
Doctorates 15 33 447 543 
Source: Adapted from NCHE (1986: 35).  
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APPENDIX F: Major Points of the National Plan (March 2001) 
 
Goal Strategic Objectives & Outcomes* 
Provide a full spectrum of advanced 
educational opportunities for an expanding 
range of the population without any form of 
discrimination 
Produce graduates with skills and 
competencies to meet the HRD needs of SA 
Outcome 1: increases participation rates 
Outcome 2: increased graduate outputs 
Outcome 3: broadened social base of 
students 
Outcome 4: increased recruitment of 
students from SADC countries 
Outcome 5: Changed enrolments by field of 
study 
Outcome 6: Enhanced cognitive skills of 
students 
 
Promote equity of access and fair chances 
for success and advance redress for past 
inequalities 
Reflect demographic realities of SA in 
student and staff composition and ensure 
that race and gender profiles of graduates 
reflect the profiles of student enrolments 
Outcome 7: Increased equity in access and 
success rates 
Outcome 8: Improved staff equity 
 
Diversify the system in terms of missions 
and programme mix to meet national and 
regional needs 
Ensure diversity through mission and 
programme differentiation 
Outcome 9: Diversity through mission and 
programme differentiation 
Outcome 10: Regulation of distance ed 
programmes 
Outcome 11: Establish a single distance ed 
institution 
Outcome 13: Regulation of private higher 
education 
 
Secure and advance high-level research 
capacity to ensure intellectual enquiry and 
application of research for technological 
improvement and social development 
Sustain research strengths and promote 
research required to meet national 
development needs and build competitive 
capabilities 
Outcome 13: Research concentration and 
funding linked to outputs 
Outcome 14: Increased graduate enrolments 
and outputs at masters and doctoral levels 
 
Build new institutional and organizational 
forms and new institutional identities and 
cultures as part of a co-ordinated national 
higher ed system 
Foster collaboration at regional level and 
restructure the institutional landscape. 
Outcome 15: Programme and infrastructural 
collaboration 
Outcome 16: New institutional and 
organizational forms 
Source: The Table appears in the CHE Annual Report (2000/20001: 6). The outcomes are 
added here to complement that table.   
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* Note that, the report suggests strategies to achieve these outcomes.  
 
The Plan outlines an implementation timeframe between March 2001 to Sept 2002 and 
describes the following set of activities relating to these goals: 
• Institutional planning (submission of niche areas, programme mixes, 3year rolling 
plans); 
• Institutional restructuring (mergers, takeovers, new institutions, distance ed, private 
ed); 
• Research (quality assurance of postgraduate programmes and distance education 
programmes, review of research outputs, coordination of research activities); and  
• General (fee levy for SADC students, role and effectiveness of NSFAS, a National 
Teacher Education Plan, a model for a National Education Information and 
Applications System, and procedures for study and work permits). 
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1. The access of historically disadvantaged and under-represented groups must be 
increased, particularly to professional fields of study in science, engineering and 
technology (SET) and in business, commerce and management. 
2. The success rates and graduation rates of historically disadvantaged and under-
represented groups at institutions of higher education must improve. No significant 
differences should exist between the success and graduation rates of advantaged and 
disadvantaged students. 
3. The numbers of historically disadvantaged students at postgraduate level must increase. 
4. The institutional climate must be improved to ensure the retention and ultimately the 
graduation of historically disadvantaged students, particularly in the SET and 
business/commerce fields.  
 
Staff 
5. The access and retention rates of historically disadvantaged and under-represented 
groups (including women) to the staff of the institution must be improved. Staff 
development programmes must be implemented. 
 
Responsiveness to societal needs 
6. Qualifications, programmes and courses must be restructured in response to broader 
changes in teaching and learning paradigms.  
7. The graduates/diplomats produced by the institution must satisfy society needs. 
8. Research outputs must increase. 
9. Partnerships and other collaborative ventures must be formed with industry, 
communities and other tertiary institutions. 
 
Governance 
10. The composition of all governance structures must be representative with regard to race 
and gender, and must reflect the communities and constituencies which the institution 
serves. 
11. Existing governance structures must be restructured and new ones established in line 
with the principles of co-operative governance.  
12. The new governance structures must include an executive leadership which must ensure 
that the institution operates efficiently and effectively. 
 
Source: Nico Cloete, Lisa Bunting and Ian Bunting (Eds) Transformation Indicators Applied to 
Two South African Higher Education Institutions (Sunnyside: CHET, 2002) 8-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
